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Changing Expectations for Board 
Oversight of Healthcare Quality: 
The Emerging Paradigm
tracy e. Miller and Valerie l. Gutmann
AbSTrACT:  Within healthcare institutions, leadership is an essential driver 
of expectations, performance, and culture. Yet boards of directors traditionally 
played a limited role in overseeing healthcare quality, providing final approval 
of credentialing decisions but deferring to the medical staff to set standards 
for the institution. Case law and standards provide little guidance for board 
performance in overseeing quality of care. Recent developments—the avail-
ability of comparative quality data, public reporting, and financial incentives for 
higher quality—have transformed expectations for board oversight. Enforce-
ment of fraud and abuse laws based on poor quality of care, as well as federal 
standards for board oversight of healthcare quality and compliance, have set 
higher standards for board conduct. This article examines the emerging para-
digm for board oversight of healthcare quality, and recommends how boards 
should proceed to meet their responsibilities in an era of comparative quality 
measures and transparency.
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Introduction
healthcare quality depends on leadership as an essential driver of 
expectations, performance, and culture. Yet the broad concepts of 
fiduciary duty convey little guidance about how boards should under-
take this responsibility. traditionally, board oversight of quality focused 
on approval of credentialing decisions—often a pro forma approval of 
judgments made by the medical staff. 
recent developments in quality improvement and measurement, as 
well as changes in regulatory oversight, have established strong finan-
cial incentives for boards to carry out their responsibilities on quality 
effectively. rapid changes in the quality arena—the availability of 
comparative quality data, public reporting on quality measures, and pay-
for-performance—all bring heightened attention and financial pressure 
to improve quality. the development of “never events” as markers of 
patient safety creates a well-delineated floor for board oversight. the 
stakes for increased transparency and public measures of substandard 
performance also have been raised by mounting compliance enforce-
ment linking poor quality to false claims, generating the possibility of 
substantial financial penalties. 
this article examines emerging trends in healthcare quality and the 
implications of these changes for board oversight. for an explicit road-
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map, boards can now look to guidelines from the federal government for 
board actions on quality and compliance; state oversight of healthcare 
delivery; and corporate integrity and deferred prosecution agreements 
in the healthcare arena. the article assesses the expectations for board 
oversight of quality that have emerged in the wake of the transformation 
in healthcare measurement and improvement. it compares the quality 
oversight responsibilities of boards of healthcare providers with those of 
parent boards of health systems and examines the available empiric data 
on board activities to oversee quality. the article concludes by recom-
mending steps boards should take to fulfill their responsibilities in an 
era of comparative quality measures and transparency.
The Transformation of Quality measurement  
and Improvement
traditionally, the performance of individual physicians was the pri-
mary basis for understanding and evaluating quality. until the 1990s, 
responsibility for overseeing the quality of care in hospitals rested pri-
marily with the medical staff, which functioned through a committee 
structure largely independent of the board of directors and manage-
ment. through credentialing, peer review of serious errors, and a 
medical staff committee structure, physicians engaged in a largely self-
regulated process to oversee quality of care. consistent with this focus 
on individual practitioners as the locus of healthcare quality, boards 
of directors had the authority to grant final approval of credentialing 
decisions; however, in practice, substantive evaluation of physicians 
occurred for the most part at the medical staff level. By and large, the 
processes to improve care were retrospective and episodic, focusing 
on post-hoc analysis of serious events to understand errors made in 
individual cases. the roles of the board, medical staff, and executive 
management often were coordinated poorly to serve quality goals, with 
the medical staff dominating quality oversight by virtue of both its pro-
fessional knowledge and perspective that quality standards were solely 
the provenance of medical expertise.1
1 Legal commentators have criticized the weakness of what has been called the “three-
legged stool” of oversight for quality, with responsibility and accountability divided 
between the medical staff, executive management, and the board. See John D. Blum, 
Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation: A Call for Change in the Face 
of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 HeAltH-MAtrix: j. l.-Med. 5 (2004); Thomas Greaney, New 
Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 14 AnnAls HeAltH l. 421, 
422 (2005); Richard Johnson, Revisiting “the Wobbly Three Legged Stool,” 4 HeAltH CAre 
MgMt. rev. 15 (1979); Brian M. Peters & Jonathan Z. Cohen, Board Quality Oversight:  
A “Real World” Systemic Compliance Model, 14tH AnnuAl HeAltH lAW inst. (Mar. 2008);  
John P. Marren et al., The Hospital Board at Risk and the Need to Restructure the Relation-
ship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws, Peer Review and Related Solutions, 12 AnnAls HeAltH l. 
179 (2003).
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historically, the joint commission on accreditation of health care 
organizations (jcaho, now the joint commission) was the primary 
external arbiter of hospital quality, apart from malpractice actions.2 
Both the federal and state governments rely on accreditation by the 
joint commission to evaluate the quality of hospital care.3 only a 
handful of states, such as new York, have conducted their own surveys.4 
criticized in the past for emphasizing administrative procedures more 
than clinical processes and outcomes,5 the joint commission changed 
its survey process in 2004 to include additional measures of clinical 
quality.6 although accreditation decisions became publicly available in 
1996, survey scores are not publicly released.7 
in fact, transparency in quality of care did not exist until recently— 
it ran counter to the ethos of a profession accustomed to self-regula-
tion and peer review confidentiality. Boards of directors could receive 
internal reports of patient deaths or serious events, but lacked system-
atic data to evaluate quality. although malpractice cases escalated in 
the 1970s and 80s, they provided limited insight into quality of care. 
2 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)  
shortened its name to “the Joint Commission” in 2007. See The Joint Commission,  
The Joint Commission Launches New Brand Identity (2007), available at  
www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/brand.htm. 
3 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved the Joint Commission 
survey as the mechanism to grant hospitals certification to participate in and receive 
funds under the Medicare Program. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a), (b), and § 1395x(e); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 488.5. In 2009, the Joint Commission’s categories for accreditation were changed; 
they are now provisional accreditation, conditional accreditation, preliminary denial of 
accreditation, denial of accreditation, and preliminary accreditation. Joint Commission, 
Joint Commission Fact Sheets: Accreditation Process Overview, available at  
www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/Fact_Sheets/overview_qa.htm;  
Joint Commission, Facts About Quality Check® and Quality Reports, available at 
www.jointcommission.org/QualityCheck/06_qc_facts.htm.
4 For example, Joint Commission hospital accreditation is not recognized by New Jersey, 
Oklahoma (except for hospital-based outpatient mental health services), Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin. States Recognizing Accreditation/Certification by the Joint Commission 
(Feb. 27, 2009), available at www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/C6A3B227-564-
E-46E3-A1D8-6CBF5DA6BEE5/0/9_07deeming.pdf. See also State of New Jersey Dept. 
of Health and Human Services, Oversight of Acute Care Health Care Facilities, available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/health/healthfacilities/hospfines/hfines.shtml.
5 Molly Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care: Why Medical Care Has Not Evolved to Meet 
Patients’ Needs, 20 HeAltH Aff. 44, 47 (2001) [hereinafter Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care].
6 Donald M. Berwick & Troyen A. Brennan, New Rules: Regulation, Markets, and the Quality 
of American Health Care 39 (1995) [hereinafter Berwick & Brennan, New Rules].  
In 2009, the Joint Commission will release an update to the Accreditation  
Requirements as part of its Standards Improvement Initiative (SII). Joint  
Commission Fact Sheets: Accreditation Process Overview, available at  
www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/Fact_Sheets/overview_qa.htm.  
SII will focus on scores for specific activities that directly affect patient health and 
safety. Standards: Facts about Joint Commission Accreditation Standards, available at 
www.jointcommission.org/Standards/facts_about_accreditation_standards.htm.
7 Communication with Joint Commission Communications Office, 3/5/09. The most cur-
rent accreditation decision for an organization is available on Quality Check, the Joint 
Commission’s website, and accreditation histories can be obtained by writing or calling 
the Joint Commission. Facts about the Public Information Policy, available at 
 www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs/Fact_Sheets/08_pip.htm.
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By the early 1990s, studies had begun to show that malpractice actions 
were closer to a lottery than a fair, equitable way to reimburse patients 
for medical harm; the number of actions brought grossly under-
represented the rate of medical injury, and patients who did sue often 
lacked a valid claim.8 Data on the exceptionally high rate of medical 
errors leading to patient death or serious injury began to emerge in 
the 1990s, and confirmed that malpractice actions covered only a small 
fraction of instances of patient harm from malpractice.9 the number 
of disciplinary actions by state governments, like malpractice cases, 
encompassed a small subset of physician malpractice.10 
the science of quality measurement and improvement first emerged 
in the 1970s as an organized field, prompted by government and pri-
vate payor concerns about the cost of care and studies showing wide 
regional variation in utilization of healthcare procedures unrelated to 
population needs.11 seeking to reduce the high rate of medical errors, 
researchers sought to apply the model of continuous quality improve-
ment developed by industry to the processes of healthcare delivery.12 
in this evolving understanding of quality, systems of care—not indi-
vidual practitioner error—were both the cause of many serious adverse 
events and the potential solution for prevention. Quality experts and 
researchers developed measures of processes and outcomes of care 
designed to evaluate the treatment provided to individual patients, as 
well as the systems of care within hospitals, health plans, and other 
providers.13
8 R. Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Neg-
ligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 325 neW eng. j. Med 245 (1991) 
(explaining that malpractice claims are only a rough measure of identifying and 
remedying specific problems, and malpractice claims are not very useful as an indica-
tor of the quality of care). One study showed that 98 percent of all adverse events due 
to negligence did not result in malpractice claims, and thus, the fraction of medical 
negligence that leads to claims is probably under 2 percent.
9 The Institute of Medicine report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, was a 
watershed in public recognition of the extraordinarily high rate of preventable medical 
errors, and the toll of those errors on morbidity and mortality of patients across the 
economic and healthcare spectrum. inst. of Med., to err is HuMAn: Building A sAfer HeAltH 
systeM (Linda T. Kohn, et al, eds. 2000) [hereinafter to err is HuMAn: Building A sAfer HeAltH 
systeM]. 
10 Id. A study in the 1990s by the Public Citizen Research Group found that there were 
only approximately three thousand disciplinary actions each year (among 584,900 
medical doctors), and fewer than 10 percent of those were for negligent or poor- 
quality care.
11 Prominent healthcare quality researchers noted that healthcare quality problems 
could be classified into three categories: underuse, overuse, and misuse, with wide-
spread errors in all three categories. Mark Chassin & Robert Gavin, The Urgent Need to 
Improve Health Care Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1002 (1998) [hereinafter Chassin & Gavin, 
The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality].
12 Berwick & Brennan, New Rules, at 113–18.
13 Id. at 115. 
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Comparative measures as a precursor to transparency 
as early as the 1990s, private payors, including large employers such as 
General electric, regional business coalitions, and government purchas-
ers, sought to drive payment based on quality, or “pay-for-performance.”14 
however, public and private payors lacked sufficient market share and 
access to comparative measures across hospitals, health plans, and other 
providers necessary to effect change. as noted by commentators, the 
business case for quality was weak; hospitals and other providers were 
not rewarded for higher performance or investment in quality, outside 
of capitated systems that could capture some of the savings.15 Moreover, 
providers were not penalized for poor performance.16 
in 2000, the national Quality forum (nQf) was created as part of 
a concerted strategy by public and private payors to coordinate pur-
chasing power to generate publicly available, reliable measures as a 
basis to improve quality, create public transparency, and enable market 
choice by purchasers and consumers.17 over the past eight years, this 
coordinated effort, combined with advances in quality measurement 
and improvement, has generated comparative measures across three 
interrelated dimensions of healthcare quality: patient safety, quality 
improvement, and patient satisfaction.18
Patient safety 
By the mid 1990s, empirical studies showing the frequency of patient 
deaths and serious harm caused by medical error had generated public 
alarm about the safety of medical practice. the landmark 1999 report 
by the institute of Medicine, To Err is Human, attributed approximately 
44,000 to 98,000 deaths each year to medical errors. Medication errors 
14 Tracy Miller & Sheila Leatherman, The National Quality Forum: A “Me-Too” or a Break-
through in Quality Measurement and Reporting?, 18 HeAltH Aff. 233 (1999) [hereinafter 
Miller & Leatherman, The National Quality Forum]. In the absence of data on qual-
ity, businesses relied on volume of procedures as a placeholder. Coye, No Toyotas in 
Health Care; Fraser et al., The Pursuit of Quality by Business Coalitions: A National Survey, 
18 HeAltH Aff. 158 (1999). Private health plans also used quality data as a basis for 
choosing which providers would serve in their networks. N.A. Hanchack et al., U.S. 
Healthcare’s Quality-Based Compensation Model, 17 HeAltH CAre finAnCing rev. 143 (1996).
15 Sheila Leatherman et al., The Business Case for Quality: Case Studies and an Analysis, 
22 HeAltH Aff. 17 (2003).
16 Berwick & Brennan, New Rules, at 49; see also Inst. of Med., Rewarding Provider Performance: 
Aligning Incentives in Medicare (Pathways to Quality Health Care Series) 33 (2006).
17 Miller & Leatherman, The National Quality Forum.
18 The two most important concepts in the evaluation of measurement are validity (or 
accuracy) and reliability. Many challenges still exist, including the need for risk adjust-
ment to account for differences in patient conditions, reliability of reporting across 
institutions, and the validity of measures to capture quality. See Coye, No Toyotas in 
Health Care. However, recent studies demonstrate that challenges remain in accurately 
measuring hospital quality. See Timothy Bhattacharyya, Measuring the Report Card: The 
Validity of Pay-for-Performance Metrics in Orthopedic Surgery, 28 HeAltH Aff. 526 (2009). 
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alone accounted for 7,000 deaths a year.19 studies issued before and 
after the report reinforced the notion of a healthcare system fraught 
with risk for patients. studies showed widespread errors, high rates of 
inappropriate treatment that posed risks to patients, and undertreat-
ment that led to patient harm.20 studies of medical errors spurred 
development of patient safety protocols by specialty societies, hospitals, 
and quality improvement experts, but did not generate data showing 
widespread improvement.21 By 2002, the nQf had developed a list of 
“never” events that should not occur, such as operation on the wrong 
patient, operation on the wrong site or limb, and death or serious dis-
ability associated with a medication error. the list was updated in 2006.22 
on april 30, 2008, the centers for Medicare and Medicaid services 
(cMs) announced that Medicare would not pay for certain conditions 
acquired during the hospital stay, effective october 1, 2008.23 in the 
19 to err is HuMAn: Building A sAfer HeAltH systeM. 
20 See, e.g., Elise C. Becher and Mark R. Chassin, Improving Quality, Minimizing Error: Making 
it Happen, 20 HeAltH Aff. 68 (2001). For example, studies found that medication errors 
caused about 10 preventable injuries—one-fifth of which were life-threatening— 
to hospitalized patients per week at each of two large urban teaching hospitals  
(D.W. Bates et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and Potential Adverse Drug Events, 
274 JAMA 29 (1995)); twenty-four million Americans inappropriately received antibiot-
ics for colds and other upper respiratory viral infections (R. Gonzales et al., Antibiotic 
Prescribing for Adults with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis 
by Ambulatory Care Physicians, 278 JAMA 901 (1997)); A.C. Nyquist et al., Antibiotic 
Prescribing for Children with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis, 
279 JAMA 875 (1998); and in a group of seven managed care plans, 16 percent of 
hysterectomies performed were inappropriate (S.J. Bernstein et al., The Appropriateness 
of Hysterectomy, 269 JAMA 2398 (1993)).
21 In response to data showing prevalent medical errors, progress did occur in specific 
hospitals that undertook targeted improvement initiatives. See, e.g., Sharon Silow-
Carroll et al., Hospital Quality Improvement: Strategies and Lessons from U.S. Hospitals, 
The Commonwealth Fund (April 2007). See also Yosef D. Dlugacz et al., The Quality 
Handbook for Health Care Organizations: A Manager’s Guide to Tools and Programs 
(2004); Chassin & Gavin, The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality, at 1001 (“A few 
health plans, hospitals, and integrated delivery systems have made impressive efforts 
to improve their quality of care, and a number of successes in improving quality for 
specific patient groups have been documented.”). However, Chassin and Gavin note 
that “many . . . institutions have made little, if any, effort to improve . . . .”
22 National Quality Forum, Serious Reportable Events Transparency &  
Accountability are Critical to Reducing Medical Errors, available at  
www.qualityforum.org/projects/completed/sre/fact-sheet.asp. The National  
Quality Forum (NQF) uses a consensus process with broad provider and  
public input to develop its measures. National Quality Forum, Members,  
available at www.qualityforum.org/pdf/list_of_members.pdf;  
see also National Quality Forum, Serious Reportable Events Transparency &  
Accountability are Critical to Reducing Medical Errors, available at  
www.qualityforum.org/projects/completed/sre/fact-sheet.asp. 
23 73 Fed. Reg. 23,547–52. The final regulation is available at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(4)(D)(ii)(1); 
See also CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (Present on Admission Indicator): Overview, 
available at www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalAcqCond/01_Overview.asp. The events for 
which CMS limits Medicare reimbursement are not the same as the National Quality 
Forum’s 28 never events, although there is overlap between the two lists. Some states 
have decided not to reimburse for never events: In 2008, for example, Massachusetts 
determined that state-sponsored insurance programs would no longer pay  
for serious reportable events. Mass. Health Care Quality and Cost Council,  
HCQCC Update: Patient Safety (2008), available at  
www.mass.gov/Ihqcc/docs/annoucement/update_09182008.pdf. According to CMS, 
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wake of the cMs policy decision not to pay for hospital-acquired condi-
tions, private plans embraced the same approach.24 
Quality improvement measures
the decision by cMs not to pay for hospital-acquired conditions 
followed its initial pay-for-performance initiative based on quality of 
care measures for five conditions: 
1. heart attack, 
2. heart failure, 
3. pneumonia, 
4. coronary artery bypass graft, and 
5. hip and knee replacements.25
in 2000, cMs reported in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
on national measures of hospital quality of care for these conditions 
by region, informing hospitals confidentially of their own scores com-
pared to regional and national rates of performance.26 cMs reported 
that care for Medicare fee-for-service plan beneficiaries “improved sub-
stantially” between 1998-1999 and 2000-2001, but the agency still called 
for further improvement.
Patient satisfaction 
the third dimension of quality measurement and reporting advanced 
by researchers, private organizations, and the federal government 
relates to patient satisfaction.27 Patient satisfaction measures assess the 
patient’s experience of care, seeking to capture broad considerations of 
whether patients and their families are treated with dignity and respect 
and whether care is patient-centered, i.e., engineered to meet patients’ 
seven states have submitted plans to amend the state Medicaid program to restrict 
payment for selected adverse events. DHHS OIG, Adverse events in HosPitAls: stAte rePort-
ing systeMs iv (Dec. 2008), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-07-00471.pdf.
24 For example, Cigna HealthCare announced on April 17, 2008 that it would no longer 
reimburse for these avoidable events when permitted under its hospital contracts. 
Mike Mitka, Public, Private Insurers Refusing to Pay Hospitals for Costs of Avoidable Errors, 
299 JAMA 2495, 2495 (2008).
25 Press Release, CMS, Medicare Pay-for-Performance Demonstration Shows Significant 





26 Stephen F. Jencks et al., Quality of Medical Care Delivered to Medicare Beneficiaries: A Pro-
file at State and National Levels, 284 JAMA 1670 (2000). See also Stephen F. Jencks et al., 
Change in the Quality of Care Delivered to Medicare Beneficiaries, 1998-1999 to 2000-2001, 
289 JAMA 305 (2003). 
27 CMS, Hospital Quality Initiatives: HCAHPS: Patients’ Perspectives of Care Survey, available 
at www.hcahpsonline.org/home.aspx. See also Picker Inst., About Picker Institute, avail-
able at www.pickerinstitute.org/about/about.html. 
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personal needs and values. while hundreds of patient satisfaction mea-
sures had been available from private vendors and companies, in 1995 
cMs launched the consumer assessment of healthcare Providers and 
systems Program (cahPs) initiative to develop a standard set of pub-
licly reported, valid measures that would permit comparison across 
institutions. available now on the cMs website, the measures evaluate 
eighteen key aspects of the hospital experience, including:
communication with nurses and doctors;•	
responsiveness of hospital staff; •	




overall rating; and •	
recommendation of the hospital.•	 28 
Moving to transparency and pay-for-performance
the transparency of quality data has become instrumental in the 
evolution of pay-for-performance programs and quality improvement 
generally, with clear implications for board duties and accountability 
to public authorities.29 Beginning in 2003, cMs offered hospitals a 
financial incentive to report quality and safety data.30 in 2005, cMs 
established the hospital compare website, providing quality data to 
spur hospital improvement and promote consumer choice based on 
quality.31 the hospital compare website provides comparative data 
28 CMS, HCAHPS Fact Sheet (CAHPS® Hospital Survey) (Mar. 2008), available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/HospitalHCAHPSFactSheet200807.pdf 
[hereinafter HCAHPs Fact Sheet]. Similar patient satisfaction measures also have been 
developed for nursing home care.
29 Studies have confirmed that publicly reported measures have led to quality improve-
ment. See Peter K. Lindenauer et al., Public Reporting and Pay for Performance in Hospital 
Quality Improvement, 356 neW eng. j. Med. 486 (2007); Constance Fung et al., Systemic 
Review: The Evidence that Publishing Patient Care Performance Data Improves Quality 
of Care, 148 Ann. intern. Med 111 (2008); Judith Hibbard et al., Does Publicizing Hospital 
Performance Stimulate Quality Improvement Efforts? 22 HeAltH Aff. 94 (2003) (making 
quality information public results in increased quality improvement efforts). See also 
Mark Chassin, Achieving and Sustaining Improved Quality; Lessons from New York State 
and Cardiac Surgery, 21 HeAltH Aff. 40 (2002); But see Mark Chassin et al., Benefits and 
Hazards of Reporting Medical Outcomes Publicly, 334 neW eng. j. Med. 394 (1996) for a 
description of the potential pitfalls with the release of quality data. The data are more 
equivocal about the impact of transparency on consumer choice. See note 45. 
30 Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (RHQDAPU),  
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B). See also CMS, Hospital Quality Initiatives:  
Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update, available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/08_HospitalRHQDAPU.asp.
31 The Hospital Compare website is available at www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov. 
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from the hospital Quality initiative32 and voluntarily submitted data 
on patient satisfaction from the hospital cahPs initiative.33 starting in 
july 2007, hospitals that collected and submitted cahPs data to cMs 
were rewarded, and those that failed to do so were penalized.34
Pay-for-performance became operational for a defined set of hospi-
tal quality measures in 2005, with hospitals incentivized and reimbursed 
based on their performance.35 among the demonstration projects 
implemented by cMs, the Premier hospital Quality incentive Dem-
onstration, started in 2003, is one of the most significant.36 hospitals 
scoring in the top 10% for a given set of quality measures received a 
2% bonus payment on top of the standard DrG payment for the rel-
evant discharges.37 those scoring in the next highest 10% received a 
1% bonus. in the third year of the program, cMs reduced payments to 
hospitals that did not meet a threshold score on quality measures.
in november 2002, cMs implemented public reporting on com-
parative quality measures for nursing homes with the nursing home 
Quality initiative (nhQi).38 the nhQi measures assess nursing home 
quality of care, examining specific services such as the percent of 
residents given vaccinations (such as pneumococcal and influenza), 
and the percent of residents who have pressure sores or urinary tract 
infections, who lose too much weight, or who have moderate to severe 
32 Numerous other websites also report comparative data on hospital performance 
on these and other measures. Among these are the Leapfrog Group, the National 
Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA), and the Health Plan Employer Data and 
Information Set (HEDIS). States often have their own public reporting sites, such as the 
one operated by California’s Hospital Assessment and Reporting Taskforce (CHART) 
program, which publishes its data at CalHospitalCompare.org.
33 Voluntary collection of Hospital CAHPS (HCAHPS) data for public reporting began 
in October 2006, and the first public reporting of HCAHPS results occurred in March 
2008. HCAHPS Fact Sheet.
34 CMS, Hospital Quality Initiatives: Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment 
Update, available at www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/08_HospitalRHQDAPU.asp.
35 CMS, Medicare “Pay-for-Performance (P4P)” Initiatives, available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?counter=1343 [hereinafter  
Medicare “Pay-for-Performance (P4P)” Initiatives]. CMS’s Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) 
initiatives are intended to continue the transition from Medicare‘s fee-for-service pay-
ment systems to a system focused on quality of care. See Medicare Improvements for 
Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) § 131(d); US DHHS, develoPMent of A PlAn  
to trAnsition to A MediCAre vAlue-BAsed PurCHAsing ProgrAM for PHysiCiAn And  
otHer ProfessionAl serviCes: issues PAPer (Dec. 9, 2008), available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/PhysicianFeeSched/downloads/PhysicianVBP-Plan-Issues-Paper.pdf.
36 In another effort to provide standardized mechanisms to compare healthcare quality, 
most HMOs report quality performance data to the National Committee for Quality 
Assurance (NCQA) as a basis for quality “report cards.” For a discussion of the limitations 
of health plan reports cards for consumers, see Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care.
37 Medicare “Pay-for-Performance (P4P)” Initiatives.
38 CMS, Nursing Home Quality Initiatives: Overview, available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/NursingHomeQualityInits/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage.  
In fact, national reporting of nursing home quality information existed prior  
to the introduction of the NHQI in October 1998, with the Nursing Home  
Compare website. The NHC website is available at www.medicare.gov/NHCompare.
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pain.39 in December 2008, cMs released quality ratings on its web-
site—based on health inspection surveys, staffing information, and 
quality of care measures—for every nursing home in the united states 
that participates in Medicare and Medicaid.40 cMs plans to implement 
a pay-for-performance demonstration in nursing homes in 2009.41
not surprisingly, the impact of financial incentives offered by the 
federal government has been magnified by the adoption of pay-for-
performance by health plans. hMos were the earliest and broadest 
adopters of quality measures.42 a 2006 study found that more than 
half of commercial hMos use pay-for-performance in their provider 
contracts.43 health plans also have extended pay-for-performance to 
physicians, provoking controversy about whether publicly released 
measures actually assess quality of care or cost savings. in one highly 
publicized enforcement action, the new York state attorney General 
sought changes in health plan quality measures to assure that they 
reflected quality of care, rather than efficiency or cost savings.44 
taken together, advances in quality measurement and public 
reporting over the past two decades create powerful new incentives 
for boards of healthcare institutions to focus on quality—direct finan-
cial incentives, potential harm or gain to reputation, and the impact 
on market share and consumer choice.45 for the first time, boards of 
39 CMS, Nursing Home Quality Initiatives: Overview, available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/NursingHomeQualityInits/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage.
40 CMS, roAdMAP for iMPleMenting vAlue driven HeAltHCAre  
in tHe trAditionAl MediCAre fee-for-serviCe ProgrAM 2, available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/downloads/VBPRoadmap_OEA_1-16_508.pdf. 
41 The Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing (NHVBP) Demonstration is slated to begin 
in summer 2009. CMS, Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing Demonstration, available 
at www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/NHP4P_Summary.pdf. CMS 
also has launched quality reporting initiatives across the continuum of care, including 
public reporting of End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) measures and physician quality 
measures. CMS, End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Quality Initiative: Overview, available at 
www.cms.hhs.gov/ESRDQualityImproveInit/downloads/ESRDOverview.pdf. 
42 Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care.
43 M. Rosenthal et. al., Pay for Performance in Commercial HMOs, 355 n. engl. j. Med. 1895 (2006). 
44 See Agreement on Physician Ranking Programs between New York Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo and CIGNA HealthCare, available at www.massmed.org/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=20295;  
Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces  
Doctor Ranking Agreement with Independent Health (Dec. 12, 2007), available at  
www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2007/dec/dec12a_07.html (Independent Health 
Association, Inc. agrees to adopt Cuomo’s Model Code for doctor ranking programs).
45 Generally, consumers have not used quality data but relied more on word of mouth. 
Judith H. Hibbard & Jacquelyn J. Jewett, Will Quality Report Cards Help Consumers?, 
16 HeAltH Aff. 218 (1997). But a more recent study by Hibbard et al. found that con-
sumers will use quality information if the reports are salient and actionable. Judith H. 
Hibbard et al., It Isn’t Just about Choice: The Potential of a Public Performance Report to 
Affect the Public Image of Hospitals, 62 Med. CAre res. & rev. 358 (2005). In a major study, 
company executives reported that they examine health plan quality data when choos-
ing employee health plans, but few use the data to influence employee choice of plan. 
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directors have the data and tools to fulfill their fiduciary duty to over-
see quality in a meaningful way, ranging from patient safety to quality 
improvement and patient satisfaction. these changes have significant 
implications for existing legal standards and government oversight of 
healthcare board fiduciary duties.
board Fiduciary Duties: Standards from Statutes  
and Case law
Boards of directors for nonprofit and for-profit organizations must 
meet two basic fiduciary duties: the duties of care and loyalty.46 Boards 
of directors for nonprofit entities are held to a third duty: the duty of 
obedience to mission.47 these duties are set forth both in case law and 
state statutes governing nonprofit corporations.48 
the duty of care requires directors to carry out their obligations in 
good faith with the degree of care, attention, and skill that a person 
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under the cir-
cumstances.49 judicial decisions interpret this duty to require board 
members to make an informed decision and to act in a manner that is 
M. Rosenthal et. al., Employers’ Use of Value-Based Purchasing Strategies, 298 JAMA 2281 
(2007). See also Charles N. Kahn et al, Snapshot of Hospital Quality Reporting and Pay-
For-Performance Under Medicare, 25 HeAltH Aff. 148 (2006).
46 For an in-depth discussion of board duties, see James Fishman, Improving Charitable 
Accountability, 62 Md. l. rev. 218, 229–30 (2003) [hereinafter Fishman, Improving 
Charitable Accountability]. See also Thomas Greaney & Kathleen Boozang, Mission, 
Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 yAle j. HeAltH Pol’y l. & etHiCs 1 
(2005) [hereinafter Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit 
Health Care Enterprise].
47 See Daniel L. Kurtz, Board Liability: Guide for Nonprofit Directors 85 (1988). However, the 
1987 Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act and the most recent edition do not provide 
advice or standards on the duty of obedience, nor is the duty of obedience generally 
recognized in the case law. See ABA, Model nonProfit CorPorAtion ACt, tHird edition (Aug. 
2008), § 8.30(b), available at www.abanet.org/rppt/meetings_cle/2008/jointfall/
Joint08/ExemptOrgCharitablePlanOrganGroup/BlackLetter.pdf [hereinafter Model 
nonProfit CorPorAtion ACt, tHird edition]. See also Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, 
and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, at 43–44; Rob Atkinson, Obedience 
as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 j. CorP. l. 43 (2008); Melanie DiPietro, Duty of 
Obedience: A Medieval Explanation for Modern Nonprofit Governance Accountability, 
46 duQ. l. rev. 99 (2007).
48 In addition, nonprofit corporations are governed by the mandates set forth by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regarding their tax exemption. See I.R.C. § 501 (c)–(d) 
(2004). The IRS rules focus primarily on mission, or in the context of healthcare, the 
requirements of the community benefit standard, and the duty of loyalty. In 2007, the 
IRS set forth standards that cover board governance.
49 Model nonProfit CorPorAtion ACt, tHird edition § 8.30(b). The newest iteration of the 
Model Act has been revised from the 1987 version: the Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. 
Act § 8.30(a)(2) called for “care of an ordinary prudent person in a like position under 
similar circumstances,” while the Third Edition § 8.30(b) requires the “care that a person 
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under the circumstances.”  
For a detailed discussion of the duty of loyalty, see Fishman, Improving Charitable 
Accountability, at 233–37.
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not reckless.50 notably, courts have not held that board members have 
a duty to investigate to uncover a problem; board members may rely 
on others to provide them with notice or information about a prob-
lem.51 the duty of care is shaped by the business judgment rule, which 
as a practical matter affords board members broad protection.52 spe-
cifically, the business judgment rule establishes that board members 
cannot be held liable for a decision they make, even if the decision 
later proves wrong and harmful to the corporation, if the directors 
acted in good faith and with the required degree of care.53 
the duty of loyalty obligates board members to act solely in the inter-
ests of the corporation, and to place the corporation’s interest above 
their personal gain.54 Board members cannot enrich themselves at the 
expense of the corporation. while transactions between an interested 
director and the corporation are not barred, state statutes and case 
law require that any such transaction be fair to the corporation, fully 
disclosed, and entered into without undue influence by the interested 
director.55 the internal revenue code imposes other highly detailed 
requirements that bar directors from excess benefit in any transaction 
with the corporation.56 Directors who breach the duty of loyalty may 
50 Thus, courts are likely to find liability only when the board’s conduct rises to the level 
of gross negligence. See Michael W. Peregrine and James R. Schwartz, Revisiting the 
Duty of Care of the Nonprofit Director, 36 j. HeAltH l. 183, 190 (2003).
51 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del, 1963); Model nonProfit CorPorAtion ACt, 
tHird edition § 8.30(b). 
52 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Janssen v. Best & 
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (explaining the rationale behind allowing 
the boards of nonprofit corporations to receive the protection of the business judg-
ment rule). See also Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The Changing Accountability 
Climate and Resulting Demands for Improved “Fiduciary Capacity” Affecting the World 
of Public Charities, 31 WM. MitCHell l. rev. 119, 123–24 (2004) [hereinafter McVeigh & 
Borenstein, The Changing Accountability Climate].
53 See Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 233 for an in-depth discussion of 
the business judgment rule. 
54 See Model nonProfit CorPorAtion ACt, tHird edition § 8.30(a)(2). Stone ex rel. AmSouth 
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006), clarified the duty of good faith, 
explaining that the duty is breached where a fiduciary acts with a purpose other than 
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, with the intent to violate the 
law, or where the fiduciary fails to act in the face of a known duty to act. The duty to 
act in good faith is not an independent fiduciary duty, but often is considered a neces-
sary element of the duties of loyalty and care, discussed below. See id. at 369–70.
55 Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 234–37. In some states, certain trans-
actions, such as a loan to directors, are prohibited. In 2004, 28 states prohibited loans 
to directors. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, governing nonProfit orgAnizAtions 226 (2004). See, 
e.g., not-for-Profit CorP. ACt § 716 “Loans to Directors and Officers.” However, a majority 
of states limit the personal liability of nonprofit directors, unless the actions are clearly 
self-interested, in bad faith, or grossly negligent. See also McVeigh & Borenstein, The 
Changing Accountability Climate, at 123. 
56 “Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions,” IRC 7.27.30 (2002). For a discussion of the full 
implications of the IRS rules for tax exempt governance, see Fishman, Improving Chari-
table Accountability, at 265; Thomas Greaney, New Governance Norms and Quality of 
Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 14 AnnAls HeAltH l. 421, 426 (2005).
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be held personally liable and may be denied indemnification for legal 
fees and cost of the breach.57
the third core fiduciary duty for nonprofit directors is the duty of 
obedience: the obligation to act in a manner that preserves the mission 
of the corporation.58 the duty of obedience prohibits transactions or 
diversion of resources for purposes outside the scope of the corpora-
tion’s mission as set forth in the articles or certificate of incorporation.59 
in recent years, this duty has come to the fore, as state attorneys gen-
eral have weighed the conversion of nonprofit healthcare plans to 
for-profit status and the closure of institutions.60 
while fiduciary duties establish expectations for board conduct, 
application of these duties and the broad sweep of the business judg-
ment rule reflect courts’ reluctance to hold nonprofit board members, 
most of whom serve as volunteers, to an exacting standard.61 in fact, 
legal commentators have noted the shortcomings of fiduciary duty 
standards for both for-profit and nonprofit boards as a vehicle to hold 
boards accountable and provide needed oversight.62 in the nonprofit 
57 Board members may face removal by state attorneys general and criminal liability for 
actions that violate federal and state laws. See, e.g. Butterworth v. Anclote Manor Hosp., 
566 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). However, the “bar for director liability is quite 
high and the range of potential defenses and protection from liability is broad. Indeed, 
directors can go about their jobs even in a grossly negligent manner and have no lia-
bility, with one caveat: directors must act in good faith …” Gary Brown, Unclean Hands: 
As Dangerous in the Boardroom as the Operating Room? HeAltH lAW. neWs 19, 20 (Sept. 
2008) [hereinafter Brown, Unclean Hands]. Some states have granted immunity and 
mandated corporate indemnification and interim advancement of litigation expenses 
for directors from suits arising from affairs of the nonprofit corporation where there is 
good faith. Id. 
58 See note 47.
59 For examples of cases where the board was held accountable for diverting resources 
for reasons outside the corporation’s mission, see Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found., 
329 P.2d 118 (Cal. Dis. Ct. App. 1958) (corporation’s attempt to dedicate funds to unau-
thorized purpose led to removal of trustee); Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. 
Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (articles of incorporation called for operation of hospital, 
not establishment of neighborhood clinics).
60 See, e.g., Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999) 
(New York State Attorney General successfully blocked sale and close of Manhattan 
Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital (MEETH) based on failure to honor obedience to mission, 
but also in part on the board’s failure to fulfill its duty of care in seeking alternatives to 
closure and the deal terms negotiated by a conflicted agent).
61 u.s. gen. ACCounting offiCe, tAx-exeMPt orgAnizAtions: iMProveMents PossiBle in PuBliC, irs, And 
stAte oversigHt of CHArities (2002), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d02526.pdf; 
Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 218, n. 6. 
62 Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 
at 7; Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principles: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit 
and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 n.y. l. sCH. l. rev., 457, 499–500 (1996); Thomas 
Boyd, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-for-Profit Corporation  
Statutes, 72 ioWA l. rev. 725, 745 (1987). Just as failures of governance evidenced by 
cases such as Enron and Worldcom called into question the effectiveness of board 
standards and public accountability for for-profit companies, the most recent  
financial institution failures will no doubt spark renewed debate about the public 
accountability of boards of for-profit corporations, especially in light of the extraordi-
nary price paid by taxpayers. For in-depth analysis of past corporate failures,  
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arena, the paucity of legal precedents on board duties is compounded 
by the lack of transparency, the absence of third parties (such as share-
holders) with an interest in overseeing the corporation’s actions, and 
the limited resources of state attorneys general.63 while the duty of 
mission could serve as an important litmus test for board duties with 
respect to overseeing healthcare quality, it has been applied unevenly 
by attorneys general and the courts, and has not served as meaning-
ful ballast.64 although much of the case law delineating board duties 
of care and loyalty focuses on financial mismanagement and self-
dealing, several landmark cases have established expectations for the 
duty of care that have direct application to board oversight of quality, 
particularly in terms of the duties to investigate and require adequate 
reporting systems. 
one of the first notable cases to address board fiduciary duties to 
prevent corporate misconduct, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, set forth dicta 
broadly protecting board members from liability for corporate or 
employee wrongdoing absent explicit knowledge of the wrongdoing or 
facts that should have put board members on notice of the conduct.65 
in the 1963 case, stockholders brought an action against the directors 
for breach of the duty of care in failing to prevent violation of federal 
antitrust laws. specifically, the complaint asserted that the board mem-
bers had actual knowledge of the wrongful conduct or facts that could 
have put them on notice, or in the alternative, were liable for failure 
to take action to learn of and prevent antitrust violations. the court 
soundly rejected the notion that the board should have put a system 
in place to bring misconduct to its attention, stating in what would 
become oft-repeated dicta, “there is no duty upon directors to install 
and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing 
which they have no reason to suspect exists.”66 the court recognized, 
however, that board members could be held accountable for ignoring 
signs of wrongdoing through willful conduct or inattention to obvious 
signs of misconduct.
see ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, Report of the American  
Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (2003), available at 
www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_report.pdf. See also Eric Dash & 
Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, n.y. tiMes, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (discuss-
ing the poor oversight and lack of risk controls at the bank and its staggering losses). 
63 Legal scholars have described the limited accountability of directors and the weak-
nesses in a regulatory framework dependent on state attorneys general with scarce 
resources to oversee a vast set of institutions. See Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, 
and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, at 19, 44–46. 
64 Lamenting the weakness of the doctrine as it has been applied to date, Greaney and 
Boozang advocate “mission primacy” as one means to invigorate and inform board 
oversight. Id. at 82–84.
65 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
66 Id. at 130.
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eleven years later, the 1974 case of Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National 
Training School set a somewhat higher standard for conduct of non-
profit boards.67 a class action brought by patients of sibley Memorial 
hospital, the suit asserted that board members had breached their 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in the management of sibley’s 
funds. specifically, the plaintiffs maintained that the board was negli-
gent in managing hospital funds; the finance committee did not meet 
between 1960 and 1972, during which time the funds were in accounts 
that earned little or no interest at five financial institutions. five of the 
hospital trustees held positions of responsibility at the five financial 
institutions, leading to the claim of breach of loyalty. 
stating that corporate directors are liable for their negligent mis-
management of corporate funds, the court went on to note that while 
trustees often are held to a negligence standard, a director “must 
often have committed gross negligence.”68 the court made clear that 
a director who fails to acquire the information necessary to carry out 
his or her supervisory role has breached the duty of care. the court 
also noted that a board member “whose failure to supervise permits 
negligent mismanagement by others to go unchecked has committed 
an independent wrong against the corporation.”69
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation addressed the 
duties of a board of directors to oversee legal compliance—or as 
the court framed the issue, “corporate performance.”70 the suit was 
brought by shareholders of the for-profit corporation. they charged 
that the board’s failure to oversee compliance with federal anti-kick-
back laws resulted in significant financial losses to the corporation. 
holding that the board members had not breached their duty of care, 
the court pointed to the fact that the board had taken numerous steps 
to oversee and promote compliance, including adoption of a policy to 
curtail certain payments to physicians, appointment of the chief finan-
cial officer to serve as compliance officer, and issuance of compliance 
guidance for employees. 
the Caremark court noted the difficulty of holding board mem-
bers of a nonprofit accountable for breach of duty in the absence 
of a conflict of interest or self-dealing, but went on to recognize two 
grounds for such accountability: (1) a board decision that is ill-advised 
or negligent, and (2) “an unconsidered failure of the board to act in 
67 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D. D.C. 1974). It 
is useful to note that Stern is unique in that the patients were given standing. In most 
jurisdictions, only the Attorney General has standing to pursue board misconduct.
68 Id. at 1013.
69 Id. at 1014.
70 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented 
the loss.”71 expressly narrowing the broad sweep of the dicta in Graham 
v. Allis-Chalmers, the court stated that while boards have no affirmative 
duty to conduct investigations to identify wrongdoing, they can and 
should be held responsible for assuring that an effective information 
gathering and reporting system exists as a predicate for the board to 
fulfill its duty of care.72
in 2001, shareholders successfully pursued board personal liability 
for failure to act in the face of persistent board inattention to violations 
of federal quality standards.73 in In re Abbott Laboratories Derivative Share-
holders Litigation, the food and Drug administration (fDa) had issued 
post-inspection and warning letters beginning in 1993 that informed 
the corporation of its failure to comply with quality standards designed 
to protect consumers from undue risk. the corporation’s safety failures 
were reported in the Wall Street Journal in 1995, and again in the press 
in 1999, after abbott violated its obligations under an earlier voluntary 
compliance agreement with the fDa. in ruling for the plaintiffs, the 
court pointed to the “sustained and systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight” over a period of more than six years.74 Given the 
egregious nature of the board failure, the case does not establish a 
high bar for board conduct; however, the ruling set significant prece-
dent by holding the board members personally liable for breach of the 
duty of care in the absence of a conflict of interest or self-dealing. the 
Abbott court stated that the board’s failure was tantamount to a lack 
of good faith, suggesting that in even in the face of the board’s long-
term, serious failure, the court framed its decision in terms of willful 
conduct and lack of good faith, rather than relying solely on a finding 
of negligence.75 subsequent cases followed suit, making it clear that 
directors who commit gross negligence by failing to take action will be 
presumed to have violated their obligation to act in good faith, and will 
fall outside the protection of the business judgment rule.76 
71 Id. at 967.
72 Id. at 970. However, the court qualified this statement in the context of personal liabil-
ity, asserting “that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, 
render a director liable . . . .”
73 In re Abbott Labs. Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003). 
74 Id. at 809. 
75 Id. at 809. 
76 In a decision handed down the same year as Abbott, two outside directors were held 
personally liable for approving a transaction despite having no personal interest in 
the transaction. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 16415 (Del. Ch. 
May 3, 2004). See also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 
2003) (finding the board’s failure to inquire about conditions and terms of executive 
compensation or to review any written agreements constituted lack of good faith 
to advance the best interest of the company); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation 
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). While board members have protection from the 
business judgment rule if they decide to take no action after an informed process, the 
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Despite Caremark’s recognition of the board’s duty to assure that an 
effective reporting system exists, the case law consistently reinforces the 
basic demarcation between the duties of the board and executive man-
agement; the board oversees the actions of executives, but is not itself 
responsible for managing day-to-day operations or conducting investi-
gations without notice of the need to do so. the obligation to manage 
operations and senior staff in every realm, including quality measure-
ment and improvement, is a management function. for example, the 
board is not responsible for developing a system of quality measure-
ment and reporting, but must assure that an effective system exists and 
review the data it generates to evaluate the institution’s performance.
bringing Quality Within the Purview of Hospital  
and board Duties
as case law evolved to recognize minimum standards for board fidu-
ciary duties, legal doctrines developed to establish hospital liability for 
quality, bringing the quality of care within the ambit of hospital board 
responsibilities. until 1965, hospital boards of directors essentially had 
no obligations to oversee healthcare quality, except for the duty to use 
reasonable care in selecting physicians. the hospital was regarded as a 
venue in which physicians provided treatment, rather than as a direct 
provider of healthcare services. the 1965 decision in Darling v. Charleston 
Community Memorial Hospital upended that assumption as a matter of pre-
vailing law.77 the plaintiff in Darling was an 18-year-old who broke his leg 
playing football. Due to negligent treatment provided by the physician 
on call in the emergency room on the day of admission, and thereafter 
by the physician and nurses, the plaintiff developed gangrene, resulting 
in the amputation of his leg. rejecting the hospital’s assertion that it had 
no obligation beyond using reasonable care in selecting its physicians, 
the court stated in what is now well-settled law, “Present day hospitals, 
as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than 
furnish facilities for treatment.”78
while Darling set a precedent that quickly changed legal expecta-
tions and potential liability for hospitals, courts continued to grapple 
with whether hospitals should bear potential liability for the actions 
protection does not extend to board inaction in the face of notice of a problem. For 
further discussion of the distinction between a decision not to act and inaction, see 
Brown, Unclean Hands.
77 Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
78 Id. at 257, 332. While Darling involved failure to use reasonable care in credentialing, 
later cases have broadened the duties of the hospital board. See Oehler v. Humana 
Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989); Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, 466 (Ariz. 1980) 
(discussing emerging trend imputing inherent responsibility to monitor overall quality 
of care to hospitals).
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of physicians who practice as independent contractors with medical 
staff privileges rather than as employees. since 1976, the courts have 
chipped away at the protection accorded hospitals by the notion that 
hospitals are not responsible for the actions of non-employed physi-
cians to whom they grant clinical privileges.79 in 1981, in Johnson v. 
Misericordia Community Hospital, the court held the hospital liable for 
negligence in granting privileges to an orthopedic surgeon whose priv-
ileges had been revoked or limited at other hospitals.80 while the case 
rested on negligent credentialing, the court cited to Darling and the 
hospital’s broader duties to evaluate the care it provides. 
following Misericordia, a long line of cases upheld hospital liability 
under the theory of corporate negligence, recognizing that the hospital 
owes an independent duty of care directly to the patient.81 in essence, 
courts have acknowledged the reality that hospitals have many avenues 
to control the quality of care, including treatment protocols, quality 
initiatives, and oversight of nursing and other services, as well as the 
fact that patients do not distinguish between employed and indepen-
dent medical staff physicians in their expectations for hospital quality 
of care or oversight. 
State oversight and enforcement 
nonprofit healthcare organizations are regulated by two indepen-
dent sources of state authority: state attorneys general and public health 
departments. within state governments, the primary authority to over-
see nonprofit corporations is vested in state attorneys general, who 
have broad authority in relation to nonprofit organizations, including 
79 See, e.g., Tuscon Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1976); Purcell v. Zimbel-
man, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544, 550 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1977); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412 (Ga. 1972); Johnson v. St. 
Bernard Hosp., 399 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Corleto v. Shore 
Mem’l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (all holding that a hospital 
has a direct and independent responsibility to take reasonable steps to (1) ensure that 
its medical staff is qualified for the privileges granted and/or (2) to evaluate the care 
provided).
80 Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d. 156 (Wis. 1981).
81 Oehler, 775 P.2d at 1272 (hospital and governing board may be liable for failure to 
supervise treatment by non-employed physicians under corporate negligence theory 
of liability); Insinga v. Labella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fl. 1989) (recognizing the corpo-
rate negligence doctrine as the independent duty the hospital owes to patients, and 
finding that because the hospital is in “a superior position to supervise and moni-
tor physician performance,” it is “the only entity that can realistically provide quality 
control.”); Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982) (hospital held liable under 
the doctrine of corporate negligence where independent contractors negligently per-
formed pediatric surgery at the hospital); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166 (Wash. 1984) 
(expressly adopting corporate negligence theory); Zambino v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., 
No. 06-3561 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (discussing application of corporate negligence to hospital 
trustees); Carter v. Hucks-Folliss, 505 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1998) (negligent credentialing).
State Oversight and Enforcement 51
Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 4
management of assets, fulfillment of mission, and closure.82 through 
licensure and regulation, state health departments directly oversee the 
quality of healthcare delivered in a wide array of settings, and by exten-
sion have authority to set standards and to sanction boards of directors 
for failure to oversee quality.
Oversight by state attorney general offices
in the wake of scandals entailing financial management, failure to 
fulfill mission, and self-dealing in the late 1990s, state attorneys general 
became more proactive in overseeing nonprofit boards.83 By and large, 
state attorneys general have continued to focus on mismanagement 
and self-dealing by nonprofit boards. accordingly, in the healthcare 
arena, state attorneys general have intervened primarily in matters out-
side the purview of healthcare quality, such as conversion to for-profit 
status, closure, and merger of facilities.84
in the most extreme cases, state attorneys general have the author-
ity to sanction or remove board members. in a 1999 case involving 
allina health system, the Minnesota attorney General asserted that 
the structure of allina health system, which included entities that pro-
vided health services and health insurance, led to conflicting missions 
between the hMo (“to manage health costs and control premiums”) 
and the hospitals (to “act as caregivers to patients”).85 he petitioned for 
the authority to appoint the board of a new entity, effectively removing 
the allina board members for conflict of interest. 
82 Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 265.
83 James Fishman describes a number of the most prominent cases of nonprofit scandals. 
Id. at 219. For examples of nonprofit scandals, see Bruce Lambert, New York Regents 
Oust 18 Trustees from Adelphi U., n.y. tiMes, Feb. 11, 1997, at A1; Aramony v. United Way, 
28 F. Supp. 2d 147, 152–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The 
Charities; In Congress, Harsh Words for Red Cross, n.y. tiMes, Nov. 7, 2001, at B1 (in 2001, 
the American Red Cross was accused of keeping over $264 million in charitable dona-
tions it received for September 11 victims in reserve); John J. Goldman, Charity Ex-Chief 
Admits to Theft, l.A. tiMes, July 4, 2002, at A12 (in 2002, the director of Hale House, a 
charity that provides shelter for babies of drug-addicted mothers, stole approximately 
$700,000 from the charity); Samuel P. King & Randall W. Roth, BroKen trust: greed, 
MisMAnAgeMent, And PolitiCAl MAniPulAtion At AMeriCA’s lArgest CHAritABle trust (University 
of Hawaii Press, 2006). See also Kathleen Boozang, Does an Independent Board  
Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance?, 75 tenn. l. rev. 83, 83 (2007). 
84 Thomas Greaney, New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 
14 AnnAls HeAltH l. 421, 423–44 nn. 8–12 (2005) [hereinafter Greaney, New Governance 
Norms] (discussing increased activism by state attorneys general). In one significant 
case, New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo launched an investigation in 
2007 into physician-ranking programs by health plans, asserting that the rankings 
could mislead consumers by confusing quality with efficiency or cost savings. See 
discussion, note 44. 
85 For a discussion of the Allina case, see Elizabeth Stawicki, Medica Case  
Could Test Attorney General’s Power over Nonprofits (Aug. 16, 2005), available at  
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/08/16_stawickie_medicahatc/ 
[hereinafter Stawicki, Medica Case Could Test Attorney General’s Power over Nonprofits]. 
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the Allina case, as well as other actions to sanction or remove non-
profit board members, demonstrate the significant authority state 
attorneys general can exercise in relation to nonprofit boards.86 indeed, 
states are much closer to healthcare institutions than the federal gov-
ernment; they oversee fewer institutions and are more knowledgeable 
about institutional leadership and the communities served. Despite 
the fact that state attorneys general are often in the most suitable posi-
tion to oversee execution of the duties of care and loyalty, their efforts 
are hampered by limited resources.87 on issues posed by healthcare 
quality, state attorneys general lack the expertise of state public health 
authorities and cMs.
oversight by state public health agencies 
states’ public health agencies generally have authority to prescribe 
and enforce measures for hospital compliance with minimum quality 
standards. this authority rests in their control of licensure for health-
care institutions.88 the primary mechanism for oversight is surveys.89 
Most states rely on joint commission surveys to evaluate hospital qual-
ity, but some conduct their own surveys. in addition to state surveys, 
many states have established incident reporting systems as a mechanism 
to track and respond to adverse events.90 By january 2008, twenty-six 
states had implemented adverse event reporting systems; twenty-three 
of those had established their own lists of reportable events, while the 
other three used the nQf’s list of never events.91 
86 Greaney, New Governance Norms, at 424; See Stawicki, Medica Case Could Test Attorney 
General’s Power over Nonprofits. In a non-healthcare setting in 1997, the New York State 
Board of Regents dismissed 18 of 19 trustees at Adelphi University for improper over-
sight of the university’s president. Bruce Lambert, New York Regents Oust 18 Trustees 
from Adelphi U., n.y. tiMes, Feb. 11, 1997, at A1. 
87 Greaney & Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 
1, 4. See also Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, at 268 (“It has long been 
demonstrated that state attorney general offices have neither the person-power, 
nor sometimes the will, to monitor nonprofits effectively.”). 
88 Most states rely on Joint Commission licensure standards and often accept such 
accreditation as the basis for a license.
89 However, recent findings demonstrate the infrequency of such surveys. In February 
2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticized CMS’s oversight of 
Medicare and Medicaid participating facilities, finding the time between surveys for 
facilities without statutory survey frequencies too long, which can increase the risk 
for quality problems. For example, as of September 30, 2007, approximately 2700 
facilities (thirteen percent) had not been surveyed in six years or more. gAo rePort to 
CongressionAl reQuesters, MediCAre And MediCAid PArtiCiPAting fACilities: CMs needs to reexAMine 
its APProACH for funding stAte oversigHt of HeAltH CAre fACilities 27, GAO-09-64, Feb. 2009, 
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d0964.pdf. CMS also found that twenty-five 
percent or more of some nursing home surveys in seven states missed serious 
deficiencies. Id. at 14.
90 See DHHS OIG, Adverse events in HosPitAls: stAte rePorting systeMs, App. D and E  
(Dec. 2008), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-07-00471.pdf.
91 See id. at App. D for a list of the states, the year each state implemented its system, the 
agency receiving the reports, the reportable event list the states use, and the number 
of adverse events reported in each state in 2006. 
State Oversight and Enforcement 53
Journal of Health & Life Sciences Law Vol. 2, No. 4
Most states that collect adverse event data (twenty-three of the 
twenty-six) use the information to hold hospitals accountable, although 
state reporting has been inconsistent and varied.92 state public health 
authorities conduct administrative reviews of data, and in the most 
serious cases can use the data to support a decision to revoke a hospital’s 
license.93 
as part of the public health oversight framework, states set standards 
for hospital and healthcare system boards. Most states set general stan-
dards for hospital boards; they do not delineate how the boards should 
fulfill the obligation to oversee quality, although most recognize the 
longstanding premise that the board has “ultimate responsibility” 
for quality. in many states, boards must credential medical staff and 
appoint the chief executive officer (ceo). 
Besides these rather general standards, regulation of board over-
sight of healthcare quality varies state-to-state. for example, the new 
jersey Department of health and human services (Dhss) code 
requires that “[t]he hospital shall have an established and function-
ing governing body responsible for establishing hospital-wide policy, 
adopting bylaws, maintaining quality of care, and providing institutional 
management and planning.”94 california law is unambiguous in vest-
ing authority over quality of care in the board of directors, but it does 
not delineate how the board should implement this responsibility. the 
law requires hospitals to ensure that the medical staff is responsible to 
the governing body “for the adequacy and quality of the medical care 
rendered to patients in the hospital.”95 
new York’s law is more explicit.96 the new York code states that the 
governing body is “legally responsible for the quality of patient care services, 
for the conduct and obligations of the hospital as an institution and for 
92 Id. at 14. See also Modern HeAltHCAre, Variation Seen in Adverse-Event Reporting  
(Dec. 16, 2008) (“Of the 26 states that operated event-reporting systems, 15 said  
hospitals don’t always report their adverse events, although all 26 states do use  
the information they collect in similar ways to improve patient safety”), available at  
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20081216/REG/312169976. In addition, in many 
states, healthcare providers must report to the state when healthcare professionals 
commit egregious errors. See, e.g., n.y. PuB. HeAltH lAW § 2803-e, “Reporting incidents 
of possible professional misconduct; n.y. PuB. HeAltH lAW § 2805-l(1–2).
93 However, as explained by public health staff in one state, “revocation could occur only 
after the hospital conducted an inadequate investigation of an event that was deemed 
‘serious,’ did not develop an appropriate corrective action plan, failed to correct state-
cited deficiencies, and was in the process of losing or had already lost its accreditation 
status.” DHHS OIG, Adverse events in HosPitAls: stAte rePorting systeMs at 15 (Dec. 2008), 
available at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-07-00471.pdf.
94 n.j. AdMin. Code. § 8:43G-5.1(b), emphasis added.
95 CAl. Code regs. tit. 22 § 70703(a), “Organized Medical Staff.”
96 The New York Department of Health has the “central, comprehensive responsibility 
for development and administration of the state’s policy with respect to hospital and 
related services” due to the significance of providing health-related service “of the 
highest quality.” N.Y. PuB. HeAltH lAW § 2800 (2008).
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ensuring compliance with all federal, state and local laws.”97 the bylaws 
adopted by the governing body must specify how it and the medical staff 
interact, and how the governing body holds the medical staff account-
able for its obligations to the community.98 new York law also requires 
that the governing body maintain “a coordinated program which inte-
grates the review of activities of all hospital services for the purpose of 
enhancing the quality of patient care and identifying and preventing 
malpractice.”99 like most states, new York requires the governing body 
to make the final decision to credential medical staff members and to 
appoint a medical director accountable to the governing body.100
states exercise oversight of board members in various ways, although 
generally there has been little discipline for poor quality of care by state 
attorneys general or public health agencies. Despite their disinclination 
to do so, states can impose penalties for board failures, although the 
most common penalty is a civil monetary penalty or fine imposed on 
the healthcare institution, not on the board members personally.101 for 
example, in 2007, california regulators imposed a $3 million fine on 
the nation’s largest nonprofit health plan for failure to provide ade-
quate oversight of quality assurance programs, particularly with respect 
to patient complaint management.102 new jersey adopted regulations 
in 2005 setting forth required periodic training for board members, 
including training on healthcare quality.103 in addition, the nj Dhhs 
may cite a hospital for a deficiency or impose monetary penalties, 
including for failure to have a functioning governing body responsible 
for maintaining quality of care. legislation introduced in 2008 created 
an “early warning system” which provides the nj Dhhs with addi-
97 n.y. CoMP. r. & regs. tit. 10 § 405.2(a) (2008): “Governing Body,” emphasis added. See 
generally n.y. CoMP. r. & regs. tit. 10 § 82.1-5 (2008) “Governing Body.” 
98 “The bylaws shall specify at least the following: “…the relationships and responsibilities 
of the governing body, hospital administration, and the medical staff, and the mecha-
nism established by the governing body for holding such parties accountable.”  
(10 NYCRR § 405.2(b)(4)(iv)). The governing body shall “ensure the medical staff 
is accountable to the governing body for the quality of care provided to patients.”  
10 NYCRR § 405.2(e)(10), emphasis added. 
99 n.y. CoMP. r. & regs. tit. 10 § 405.2(b)(6).
100 n.y. CoMP. r. & reg. tit. 10 § 405.2(e)(1)–(3).
101 State attorneys general have the authority to correct noncompliance of nonprofit 
corporations. See, e.g., CAl. CorP. Code § 5250 (1990) (“Proceedings to correct noncom-
pliance” for nonprofit corporations: “Attorney General may institute, in the name of the 
state, the proceeding necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure”). 
102 See Barbara Ostrov, Kaiser Fined $3M for Poor Response, sAn MAteo County tiMes, July 
28, 2008). The fine was due to “haphazard investigations into patient complaints and 
physician performance.” Briefs, denver roCKy MountAin neWs, July 27, 2007.
103 n.j. AdMin. Code § 8:43G-5.22(b)(2), “General Hospital Governing Body Training,” avail-
able at www.nj.gov/health/healthfacilities/documents/ac/njac43g_hoslicstd.pdf (“The 
trustee training program shall consist of at least seven hours of instruction and address 
each of the following subjects: . . . The role of the governing body in improving health 
care quality and the mechanisms available for doing so”). 
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tional oversight over the state’s hospitals.104 the bill lays out a system 
of progressive monitoring, with each subsequent step taken only if the 
hospital has neglected to take ameliorative action.105 
in new York, if individuals serve on boards with a poor record of 
quality of care, they can be effectively barred from serving on the board 
of newly created entities. newly created entities or those undergoing 
significant reorganization must apply for approval to the new York 
state Public health council, and as part of this process, all proposed 
board members must be approved for “character and competence.”106 
More specifically, to demonstrate their character and competence to 
serve on a board of a newly created entity, potential board members 
must disclose all previous boards on which they have served. the new 
York state Public health council reviews those entities, in and out of 
state, for quality and compliance deficiencies.
Federal oversight of Healthcare Quality 
traditionally, the federal government exercised its responsibility to 
oversee quality with administrative surveys and sanctions, managed by 
cMs as the federal payor for healthcare. More recently, prosecution by 
the united states office of inspector General (oiG) and the Depart-
ment of justice have played an increasing role in federal oversight, as 
prosecutors have turned to enforcement of the false claims act (fca) 
as a primary tool in combating poor quality of care. Moreover, under 
the Balanced Budget act of 2005, states have financial incentives to 
pursue fca enforcement. as a result, deferred prosecution and corpo-
rate integrity agreements have proliferated as a means to demand better 
performance of both institutions and the boards that oversee them.
104 Interview with Matt D’Orio, Deputy Comm’r, Senior Servs. & Health Sys.,  
Feb. 11, 2009 [hereinafter Interview with Matt D’Orio]; S. B.1796,  
Assem. B. A2608 (N.J. 2008), see Press Release, State of N.J. Office of the Governor, 
Governor Corzine Signs Hospital Reform Legislation (Aug. 8, 2008), available at  
www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/2008/approved/20080808.html.
105 The more interventionist steps include: (1) the Commissioner of Health meets with 
the board of directors; (2) the agency assigns consultants to participate in hospital 
board meetings; and (3) NJ DHHS appoints a monitor with the authority to override 
board decisions. Although NJ DHHS has not yet taken the most extreme of these steps, 
the agency has required organizations to create “management action plans” and has 
threatened further action which has led to quality improvement. New Jersey has not 
imposed sanctions for breach of fiduciary duty on any particular board members. 
In one instance, NJ DHHS sought relief from the State Attorney General, but no  
action was taken. Id. A list of New Jersey enforcement actions is available at  
http://nj.gov/health/healthfacilities/hospfines/summaries.shtml#bar043007.
106 See 10 n.y. CoMP. Codes r. & regs. § 600.2(b)(2)(i)–(iii), “Requirements for Approval” (“The 
applicant must satisfactorily demonstrate to the council: that there is a public need for 
the facility or the proposed new facility; … if a nonprofit corporation, that the mem-
bers of the board of directors and the officers of the corporation are of such character, 
experience, competence and standing as to give reasonable assurance of their ability 
to conduct the affairs of the corporation in its best interests and in the public interest 
and so as to provide proper care for the patients or residents to be served by the facil-
ity or the proposed facility”). 
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CMS standards
at the federal level, cMs has authority to set standards for hospital 
boards of directors as part of the hospital conditions of Participa-
tion (coP) in the Medicare programs. cMs standards established for 
boards of directors to date relate solely to the boards’ traditional role 
in overseeing the medical staff and granting final approval of medi-
cal staff credentials. Beginning in 1998, cMs set minimum health 
and safety standards for hospitals and providers to attain Medicare or 
Medicaid certification. in 2003, Medicare changed the coP standards 
to require hospitals to develop, implement, and maintain data-driven 
quality assessment and performance improvement programs, but did 
not include specific standards for boards of directors.107 however, 
institutions may be cited and penalized by cMs for a broad array of 
violations, including the failure of governance oversight.
joint commission accreditation is deemed sufficient to meet the 
requirements for Medicare participation and reimbursement.108 like 
state statutes, the joint commission leadership standards vest ultimate 
responsibility for patient safety and quality in the governing body.109 
among other requirements, the joint commission standards require 
leadership to: 
1. address conflicts among the leadership that could affect safety 
or quality;
2. create a culture of safety and quality, encourage teamwork, and 
provide education about quality to hospital employees;
107 42 C.F.R. § 482.21 (2003); 42 C.F.R. § 488.5; 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a),(b), and § 1395x(e). 
While CMS has authority to oversee hospital quality of care, it often does not actively 
do so, instead delegating compliance with such standards to the states. It has been 
argued that the federal government has been unable, “at a ground level,” to ensure 
quality of care. John P. Marren et al., The Hospital Board at Risk and the Need to Restruc-
ture the Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws, Peer Review and Related Solutions, 12 
AnnAls HeAltH l. 179 (2003).
108 Joint Commission Resources, Getting the Board on Board: What Your Board Needs to 
Know about Quality and Patient Safety 28 (2007). See also Michelle Mello et al., Fostering 
Rational Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. HeAltH Pol. Pol’y & l. 375, 382 (2005). See also 
Donald M. Berwick & Troyen A. Brennan, New Rules: Regulation, Markets, and the Quality 
of American Health Care 43 (1995) (“Just as the federal government has accepted the 
role of third-party administrators in Medicare financing, so too has it been willing to go 
along with the traditional method of overseeing hospital quality.”).
109 Joint Commission Standard LD.01.03.01. See tHe joint CoMM’n, ACCreditAtion ProgrAM: 
HosPitAl leAdersHiP (2008), available at www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/
D53206E8-D42B-416B-B887-491B6D5AA163/0/HAP_LD.pdf [hereinafter ACCreditAtion 
ProgrAM: HosPitAl leAdersHiP]. The standards also clarify that the governing body is 
responsible for providing the resources required to maintain safe, quality care, treat-
ment, and services. JCAHO Medical Staff Standard 2 states that a medical staff should 
develop and adopt bylaws and rules and regulations as both a framework for self-gov-
ernance and as a framework for “accountability to the governing body.” JCAHO Medical 
Staff Standard 2.
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3. use data to improve the safety and quality of care, treatment, 
and services; and
4. establish structures and processes that focus on safety and 
quality.110
the joint commission also encourages the reporting of “sentinel 
events” that require immediate investigation and response.111 it should 
be noted that although joint commission standards provide specific 
steps to promote the safety and quality of care within hospitals, the 
standards do not delineate responsibility between the three elements 
of leadership: the board, medical staff, and senior management. 
Federal enforcement on quality
as healthcare quality has gained prominence in the public eye, it also 
has become the focus of mounting attention and action by government 
enforcement agencies.112 armed with data that is publicly reported or 
mined from the government’s Medicare and Medicaid databases, the 
united states Department of justice, the oiG, and state attorneys gen-
eral have pursued healthcare providers for poor quality of care as a 
violation of the fca. in addition to Medicare and Medicaid databases, 
federal and state prosecutors seeking to target quality of care investi-
gations may examine data publicly reported on hospital and nursing 
homes, state adverse events reporting systems data, and sentinel events 
reported to the joint commission.113 under the recovery audit con-
110 ACCreditAtion ProgrAM: HosPitAl leAdersHiP. 
111 Joint Commission, Sentinel Events, available at  
www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/ (“A sentinel event is an unexpected occur-
rence involving death or serious physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof.”). 
The Joint Commission makes a point of distinguishing between “sentinel events” and 
“medical errors.” See also Joint Commission, Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, avail-
able at www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/PolicyandProcedures/se_pp.htm. 
The Joint Commission sets forth specific requirements for an organization  
or hospital reporting a sentinel event. If the hospital or organization  
does not follow up as required, the Commission can deny accreditation.  
The Joint Commission collects and aggregates data from the review  
of sentinel events, but makes only the statistics, not individual cases, public. 
112 See Alice Gosfield & James Reinertsen, Avoiding Quality Fraud, trustee pp.12–15 (Sept. 
2008) [hereinafter Gosfield & Reinertsen, Avoiding Quality Fraud]. As reported by 
Gosfield and Reinertsen, James Sheehan, former federal prosecutor and now New York 
State Medicaid Inspector General, asserted that the federal government will pursue 
boards of directors for poor quality under the FCA, and enumerated four questions 
that will direct the government’s inquiry: (1) Has there been a systemic failure by 
management and the board to address quality issues? (2) Has the organization made 
false reports about quality or failed to make mandated reports? (3) Has the organiza-
tion profited from ignoring poor quality or ignoring providers of poor quality? (4) Have 
patients been harmed by poor quality or given false information about quality? Id. at 3.
113 CMS is using a variety of sources in its datamining efforts, including data from the Hospi-
tal Quality Initiative and the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative. For a fuller discussion 
of these sources, see Cheryl Wagonhurst et al., The Quality of Care Cerberus: Payments, 
Public Reporting and Enforcement, 20 HeAltH lAW. *3 (Dec. 2007) [hereinafter Wagon-
hurst et al., The Quality of Care Cerberus]. State attorneys general use the Medicaid 
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tractor (rac) Program, cMs pays contractors a percentage of the 
overpayments contractors identify from their examination of Medicare 
claims submitted by healthcare facilities, physicians, and suppliers.114 
the sanctions for violations of the fca range from exclusion from fed-
eral and state healthcare programs to stiff monetary penalties; violation 
of the fca may encompass criminal as well as civil penalties.115 
in the compliance context, providers generally have been found 
liable for substandard quality of care under the fca based on one of 
two theories: (1) the treatment billed for was medically unnecessary 
or (2) the quality of care was so poor that the services were essentially 
not delivered or worthless.116 in addition, the government has pursued 
enforcement actions against hospitals for failure to properly oversee 
and credential the quality of medical staff, and for violation of regula-
tions, such as limitations on use of physical restraints.117
in quality enforcement actions under the fca, the government 
asserts that the claim submitted for reimbursement was fraudulent. each 
database. For example, the New York State Medicaid Inspector General uses the New 
York State Medicaid data for audits, investigations, and enforcement. Presentation by 
Jim Sheehan, Medicaid Inspector General, Data Mining in Health Care Compliance and 
Regulation, Seton Hall Law (June 4, 2008). CMS recently established “zone program 
integrity contractors” (ZPICs) that use databases to identify high risk areas, examine 
billing trends and patterns to target abnormal Medicare billing, and generally pursue 
fraud in a more aggressive manner. Press Release, CMS, CMS Enhances Program Integ-
rity Efforts to Fight Fraud, Waste and Abuse in Medicare, Oct. 6, 2008, available at  
www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=3291&intNumPerPa. 
114 The Deficit Reduction Act § 6031 provided a compliance enforcement incentive 
to states, specifying that if a state’s false claims legislation meets certain federally 
mandated standards, the state is entitled to a ten percent increase of the amount 
recovered in a false claims case brought under the state’s false claims act. 
115 Joan H. Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care: A Patient-Centered Approach, 37 j. 
HeAltH l. 161 (2004) [hereinafter Krause, Healthcare Fraud and Quality of Care]. However, 
some commentators have noted that the FCA may not be the optimal mechanism for 
enforcing healthcare quality because of its haphazard and sometimes counterproduc-
tive application. See Michael E. Clark, Whether the False Claims Act is the Proper Legal 
Tool for the Government to Use for Improving the Quality of Care in Long-Term Care Facili-
ties, 15 HeAltH lAW. 1, 12; 16 (2002). See also Robert Salcido, The Government’s Increasing 
Use of the False Claims Act Against the Health Care Industry, 14 j. legAl Med. 457 (Dec. 
2003) for a detailed history of the use of the FCA against the healthcare industry and 
relevant case law.
116 See, e.g., United States v. NHC Health Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (W.D. Mo. 2001). See 
also John T. Brennan, Jr. & Michael W. Paddock, Limitations on the Use of the False Claims 
Act to Enforce Quality of Care Standards, J. HeAltH & life sCienCes l. 37, 48 (Oct. 2008) 
(“Substandard care may be so extreme as to lead to factually false claims, or claims 
for worthless services. Use of the FCA to punish such transgressions is appropriate. 
These cases are not based upon theories of false certification, however.”).
117 For example, Central Montgomery Hospital in Pennsylvania was accused of improper 
use of restraints and knowingly billing federal healthcare programs for care provided 
to the inappropriately restrained patients in violation of the FCA. The hospital agreed 
to pay the federal government $200,000 and hire an independent consultant to review 
the hospital’s restraint use policies. Press Release, U.S. D.O.J., U.S. Attorney’s Office 
Reaches Agreement with Hospital to Resolve Failure of Care Allegations Stemming 
from Improper Use of Patient Restraints (July 25, 2005), available at www.usdoj.gov/
usao/pae/nursing/cmmc.html.
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time a hospital or nursing home submits a claim, it must certify compli-
ance with government statutes and regulations that are a precondition 
for payment, including the requirement that the care is medically nec-
essary and appropriate. a false certification may be either express or 
implied.118 the implied certification theory has been more controver-
sial, and has not been accepted by courts in all jurisdictions.119
Government enforcement actions have resulted in substantial pen-
alties for healthcare providers. under the fca, courts can impose 
fines from $5,000 to $10,000 per claim, and a penalty of three times 
the value of each service that was fraudulently billed. the govern-
ment can recover for claims brought within six years of the date on 
which a violation was committed, or within three years of the date on 
which the government knew or should have known that a violation was 
committed.120 Doj reported fca settlements and judgments totaling 
$3.1 billion in 2006, over 70 percent of which was attributed to health-
care case settlements, and $1.34 billion in settlements in 2008.121 
for the past decade, enforcement of substandard quality of care has 
been a priority for the oiG, which can pursue administrative remedies, 
including exclusion from the Medicare program.122 in 2000, the oiG 
118 See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698–99 (2d Cir. 2001); Harrison v. Westinghouse 
Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 786 (4th Cir. 1999). See also Krause, Healthcare Fraud 
and Quality of Care. Express false certification occurs when the statute or regulation 
by its terms requires certification of compliance and establishes that compliance is a 
prerequisite for payment. Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697–98. An implied false certification claim 
is based on the premise that submitting the claim implies compliance with statutes 
and regulations that the government would perceive to be preconditions to payment. 
Id. at 699. See also James E. Utterback, Substituting an Iron Fist for the Invisible Hand:  
The False Claims Act and Nursing Home Quality of Care—A Legal and Economic Perspective, 
10 QuinniPiAC HeAltH l.j. 113 (2007). 
119 See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 698; 703 (acknowledging that a worthless services claim is valid 
under the FCA, but limiting the use of the implied false certification theory to cases 
where the “underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly 
states” that the contractor must comply to get paid). 
120 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); 3731(b)(1)–(2) (2004). See Krause, Healthcare Fraud and  
Quality of Care.
121 Nat’l Consumer Prot. Technical Res. Ctr., Health Care Cases Comprise Bulk of DOJ’s Record 
Amount Recoveries in Fiscal 2006, 10 HeAltH CAre frAud reP. 870 (Dec. 6, 2006), available at 
http://ndcpd.misu.nodak.edu/smp/pdf/Clippings1128.pdf;  
2008 Year-End False Claims Act Update (Jan. 1, 2009), available at  
www.boardmember.com/Article_Details.aspx?id=2569. FCA settlements for allega-
tions of healthcare fraud have resulted in single payments up to $875 million dollars. 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., and Seven Others 
Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle 
Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm.
122 See Wagonhurst et al., The Quality of Care Cerberus, at *3, n. 19, citing OIG’s Morris 
Tells AHLA to Watch for Increases in False Claims Act Cases, 10 BnA HeAltH CAre frAud 
reP. 524 (July 5, 2006) (Lewis Morris, Counsel to the U.S. DHHS OIG, explaining OIG’s 
focus on using the FCA to “combat quality of care violations in hospitals and nursing 
homes.”). For example, in U.S. v. United Mem’l Hosp., the hospital entered into a federal 
plea agreement admitting overutilization of pain management surgical procedures 
and inadequate credentialing of a practicing physician. Plea Agreement, Docket No. 
1-CR-238 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 8, 2003). Two years before Tenet entered into the 2005 CIA 
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issued compliance guidance for nursing homes. noting that quality of 
care is one basis for lack of compliance, the guidance enumerated nine 
grounds of poor quality that could lead to an enforcement action:123
1. absence of a comprehensive assessment of each resident’s func-
tional capacity and a responsive care plan;
2. inappropriate or insufficient treatment to address residents’ 
clinical conditions, including pressure ulcers, dehydration, malnu-
trition, incontinence of the bladder, and mental or psychosocial 
problems;
3. failure to accommodate individual resident needs and 
preferences;
4. failure to properly prescribe, administer, and monitor prescription 
drug usage;
5. inadequate staffing levels or insufficiently trained or supervised 
staff to provide medical, nursing, and related services;
6. failure to provide appropriate therapy services;
7. failure to provide appropriate services to assist residents with activi-
ties of daily living (e.g., feeding, dressing, bathing, etc.);
8.  failure to provide an ongoing activities program to meet the indi-
vidual needs of all residents; and
9. failure to report incidents of mistreatment, neglect, or abuse to the 
administrator of the facility and other officials as required by law.
the recent proliferation of healthcare and pharmaceutical cor-
porate integrity agreements (cias) and Deferred Prosecution 
agreements (DPas) reflects the federal government’s escalating com-
resolving liability for conduct including DRG upcoding, improper outlier payments,  
kickbacks to physicians, and other fraudulent activities (discussed below), it settled 
allegations of lack of medical necessity involving surgeries at one its hospitals. See 
Press Release, OIG, OIG and Tenet Healthcare Corporation Reach Divestiture Agree-
ment to Address Exclusion of Redding Medical Center (Dec. 11, 2003), available at  
www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/press/2003/121103release.pdf. Tenet paid 
$54 million in federal fines and agreed to divest Redding Medical Center, which was 
accused of inadequate credentialing of cardiologists who conducted unnecessary 
invasive heart procedures. 
123 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 52, at 
14,289 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpgnf.pdf 
[hereinafter Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities]. In identify-
ing potential risks for fraud and abuse, the OIG Supplemental Compliance Program for 
Nursing Facilities issued in 2008 listed quality of care first, again providing in-depth 
guidance about common areas of risk for poor quality. oig suPPleMentAl CoMPliAnCe 
ProgrAM guidAnCe for nursing fACilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 190 at 56,832 (Sept. 30, 2008), avail-
able at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/nhg_fr.pdf [hereinafter oig 
suPPleMentAl CoMPliAnCe ProgrAM guidAnCe for nursing fACilities].
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pliance scrutiny.124 the agreements with hospitals, pharmaceutical 
companies, and other healthcare entities have clear implications for 
board leadership.125 specifically, cias and DPas have delineated the 
expectations and roles of the board and identified detailed oversight 
remedies.126 recent cias all set forth core requirements for the enti-
ties’ boards of directors, including the responsibility to oversee and 
certify that the corporation is in compliance with the agreement and 
federal law.127
while most cias address financial issues, prominent settlements 
have focused on healthcare quality. in 2001, Vencor, one of the nation’s 
largest operators of nursing homes and long-term hospital services, 
was accused of submitting false claims to Medicare, Medicaid, and 
tricare, the military’s healthcare program, based on poor quality 
124 Commentators have predicted that the number of quality-based enforcement actions 
will continue to increase. Carl Jean-Baptiste, Dropping the “Boom” on Healthcare, 
Md. B.j. 32, 36 (Jan./Feb. 2009). 
125 See November 2008 CIA with Bayer Corporation, which includes “specific require-
ments for the board of directors and management that will enable the OIG to closely 
monitor company practices affecting Federal health care programs and beneficiaries.” 
Press Release, U.S. D.O.J., Bayer Healthcare to Pay U.S. $97.5 Million to Settle  
Allegations of Paying Kickbacks to Diabetic Suppliers (Nov. 25, 2008), available at  
www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/081125-01.html. In January 2009, Eli Lilly 
& Co. entered into a five-year CIA with the OIG as part of a $1.4 billion settlement, 
with similar requirements. Press Release, U.S. D.O.J., Eli Lilly & Co. Corporate Integrity 
Agreement (Jan. 14, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/civil/ocl/cases/Cases/Eli_Lilly/
Corporate%20Integrity%20Agreement%20Eli%20Lilly.pdf. 
126 Healthcare organizations and other entities enter into CIAs with the OIG (or DPAs 
with the U.S. Attorney’s Office) to settle investigations arising out of false claims 
and other legal violations. Some commentators assert that DPAs permit the federal 
government to take an intrusive role in “policing, and supervising, corporate America.” 
See Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements; 45 AM. CriM. l. rev. 1, 3 (2008); Kathleen Boozang & 
Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, AM. j. l. Med. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Boozang & 
Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate Corruption].
127 According to the OIG website, the most comprehensive CIAs have certain elements 
in common, such as the requirement to implement a comprehensive employee 
training program and provide an implementation report and annual reports to the 
OIG on the status of the entity’s compliance activities. U.S. H.H.S. O.I.G., Corporate 
Integrity Agreements, available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp. They also include 
specific requirements for board action, such as the requirement to hire a compliance 
officer or appoint a compliance committee, to establish a quality assurance 
monitoring committee as part of the board of directors, and to develop written 
standards and policies. For example, the Green Valley Pavilion CIA, discussed below, 
requires that “the Board of Directors may determine to appoint itself or a committee 
of its members to serve as the [Compliance] Committee.” Corporate Integrity 
Agreement Between the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health 
and Human Services and Green Valley Pavilion et al. 3 (May 2007), available at  
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/green_valley_pavilion_05012007.pdf 
[hereinafter Green Valley Pavilion CIA]. However, CIAs are tailored to the particular 
circumstances of misconduct. A list of all CIAs, CCAs, and Settlement Agreements 
with Integrity Provisions for healthcare providers and entities is available at  
www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp. As of February 2009, the site listed  
480 entities with whom the OIG has entered into such agreements since 2000, 
including hospitals and nursing homes.
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of care and failure to staff its facilities adequately.128 the company 
entered a five-year cia mandating a comprehensive quality assurance 
infrastructure at the corporate, regional, and facility levels. the cia 
required quality committees to collect and review quality-related data to 
identify problems, determine the root cause of the problems, develop 
corrective action plans to improve care, and monitor the effectiveness 
of the interventions to ensure overall improvement in the quality of 
care and services delivered. 
the september 2006 cia with tenet healthcare corporation was 
a watershed agreement because of the broad sweep of provisions 
directing board conduct to oversee quality of care.129 the five-year cia 
required the Quality, compliance, and ethics committee of the board 
to review the effectiveness of tenet’s compliance program and adopt 
resolutions summarizing its review of the company’s compliance with 
the cia and federal healthcare program requirements. the tenet offi-
cers were required to certify the Medical center’s compliance with the 
cia and submit annual reports to the oiG.130 in addition, the cia 
required an independent entity to assess (1) tenet’s compliance with 
its written policies and procedures to achieve compliance with federal 
healthcare program requirements, and (2) the “effectiveness, reliabil-
ity, and thoroughness of tenet’s quality management infrastructure 
and systems throughout tenet.”131
in 2007, the oiG charged that Green Valley Pavilion, operated by the 
Green acres health system, had forged and altered patient charts to max-
imize reimbursement from Delaware’s Medicaid Program. the health 
system entered into a four-year cia requiring creation of a board Quality 
assurance compliance committee to address allegations of neglect and 
poor quality of care. the cia also mandated a board Quality assurance 
128 HHs And doj HeAltH CAre frAud And ABuse Control ProgrAM AnnuAl rePort for fy 2001 
(April 2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/HCFAC%20
Annual%20Report%20FY%202001.htm.
129 Press Release, Office of Inspector Gen., OIG Executes Tenet Corporate Integrity Agree-
ment: Unprecedented Provisions Include Board of Directors Review (Aug. 28, 2006), 
available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/press/Tenet%20CIA%20press%20release.pdf. 
The full Tenet CIA is available at  
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/TenetCIAFinal.pdf [hereinafter Tenet CIA]. 
See also D. Scott Jones, Combining Disciplines: Making the Connection Between Compli-
ance, Risk, and Quality Management, 9 j. HeAltH CAre CoMPliAnCe 5 (2007) (noting that 23 
of the documents’ 63 pages address or name quality issues to some degree). In regard 
to quality, the Tenet CIA required establishment of a clinical quality department, 
including a chief medical officer, senior officers, and clinical quality staff; clinical audits; 
physician credentialing; physician privileging; physician peer review; evidence-based 
medicine programs; standards of clinical excellence; utilization management and 
review; quality metrics; and other quality improvement measures. 
130 Id. The 2005 CIA with HealthSouth also contained provisions requiring board of 
director oversight, but the CIA is not as far-reaching as the Tenet CIA in outlining the 
requirements. HealthSouth Corporate Integrity Agreement (Jan. 1, 2005), available at 
ww.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/healthsouth_corporation_01012005.pdf/.
131 Tenet CIA, at 60–64; Gosfield & Reinertsen, Avoiding Quality Fraud. 
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Monitoring committee to “review the adequacy of Green acres’ system 
of internal controls, quality assurance monitoring, and patient care.”132 
finally, the cia required a nurse consultant/monitor to inspect Green 
Valley Pavilion (and five other facilities owned by Green Valley Pavilion’s 
parent company) and report to Green acres and the oiG on the facili-
ties’ compliance with applicable regulations and standards of care.133 
a more recent cia entered into by corona care convalescent 
corporation obliged the organization to create a board committee to 
oversee the quality of care.134 this committee is required to:
review the adequacy of [corona]’s system of internal con-•	
trols, quality assurance monitoring, and patient care;
ensure that [corona]’s response to state, federal, •	
internal, and external reports of quality of care issues 
is complete, thorough, and resolves the issue(s) iden-
tified; and
[make sure] that [corona] adopts and implements •	
policies and procedures [ ] designed to [provide] each 
individual [with] the highest practicable physical, 
mental, and psychosocial level of care attainable.135
the board committee must be readily available to the compliance 
officer and the independent monitor. as under the Green Valley cia, 
the monitor is responsible for assessing the effectiveness of the corona 
care internal quality control system and the facility’s response to qual-
ity of care issues, and for reporting to corona care and the oiG on the 
facility’s compliance with regulations and standards of care. 
outside the quality arena, cias and DPas entered into for violation 
of federal and state laws demonstrate both the breadth of remedies that 
government may demand in relation to boards of directors and the 
concomitant loss of board authority over governance and operations.136 
for example, in 2005, the university of Medicine and Dentistry of 
132 Green Valley Pavilion CIA. 
133 Press Release, Del. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Joseph R. Biden, III, Joins  
the United States Attorney for the District of Delaware to Announce a Settlement  
in a Fraudulent Medicaid Billing Scheme as Part of Agreement, Green Valley  
Pavilion, LLC will Make Financial Payments and be Subject to Ongoing  
Compliance Inspections (May 10, 2007), available at  
http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/media/releases/2007/mfsettlement.shtml.
134 Corporate Integrity Agreement Between the Office of Inspector General of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services and Corona Care Convalescent Corporation 4 
(Mar. 31, 2008) www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/corona_care_convalescent_
corporation_03212008.pdf.
135 Id.
136 For a discussion of the trend in CIAs and DPAs, as well as the breadth of remedies 
incorporated into the agreements, see Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson,  
“Monitoring” Corporate Corruption.
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new jersey (uMDnj) entered into a DPa for violation of the anti-kick-
back law, hiring practices that favored those with political connections, 
and other matters.137 the DPa required appointment of a federal moni-
tor with substantial authority to conduct ongoing investigations. the 
u.s. attorney’s office for the District of new jersey appointed a federal 
monitor to oversee the activities of the leadership (board, ceo, and 
senior medical staff), including governance procedures and structures, 
cost reporting and billing, and conflicts of interest.138 when the moni-
tor was eventually released, the board had been reconstituted from six 
members to a more diverse eighteen, and the ceo, general counsel, 
and chief compliance officer had all been replaced, with input from 
the monitor. 
Mounting federal expectations for boards
heightened federal and state enforcement for poor quality of care 
has occurred amidst rising standards for board oversight of corporate 
compliance and financial management. issued in 1991, the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines for Organizations (the sentencing Guidelines) was one 
of the earliest federal statements to underscore board obligations to 
prevent corporate misconduct.139 applicable to nonprofit as well as for-
profit corporations, the sentencing Guidelines expressly recognize that 
an effective compliance and ethics program can mitigate the sentence 
for a corporation. setting forth principles that may undergird future 
government compliance guidance and enforcement action, the Guide-
lines stress that a necessary element of a compliance program is a board 
that is knowledgeable about the organization’s compliance program 
and exercises reasonable oversight of the program’s effectiveness.
in 2006, the Department of justice amplified the importance of 
board conduct in prosecutorial decisions about corporate culpa-
bility in a memorandum by Deputy attorney General Paul Mcnulty 
137 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, available at  
www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/UMDNJFINALDPA.pdf. The website 
of the federal monitor is www.umdnj.edu/ethweb/federalmonitor. See also DPA 
between DOJ and Bristol-Myers Squibb Corporation (2005), available at  
www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/deferredpros.pdf (CEO replaced and  
board required to provide detailed reporting to monitor for conspiring to commit 
securities fraud); Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb Announces Agreement in  
Principle to Resolve Federal Antitrust Investigation, available at 
 www.bms.com/News/press_releases/pages/default.aspx.
138 Vasilios J. Kalogredis, N.J. University and Hospital Released from Monitorship, 237 legAl 
intelligenCer 45 (2008). UMDNJ was required to adopt the monitor’s recommendations 
for improvement unless the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed with UMDNJ that such a 
recommendation should not be adopted.
139 u.s. sentenCing guidelines MAnuAl (1992). The 2001 guidelines, which adopt the 1991 
guidelines, are available at www.ussc.gov/2001guid/CHAP8.pdf.
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(the Mcnulty Memorandum).140 the Mcnulty Memorandum advised 
prosecutors that in deciding about charges against a corporation and 
penalties, they should take into account certain enumerated factors, 
including the pervasiveness and history of the problem, and the cor-
poration’s pre-existing compliance program.141 citing the Caremark 
decision, the Mcnulty Memorandum turned to the role of the board, 
advising that prosecutors can take into account:
1. governance practices to identify wrongdoing;
2. whether board members exercise independent judgment in 
reviewing transactions;
3. whether they receive sufficient information to do so; and
4. whether the directors have established an information and 
reporting system reasonably designed to provide the board with 
timely and accurate information to make an informed judgment 
about legal compliance.142
in february 1998, oiG issued its Compliance Guidance for Hospitals, 
setting forth expectations for the goals and operation of an effec-
tive compliance program and enumerating the basic elements of any 
such program.143 the Compliance Guidance for Hospitals underscored 
the importance of culture and leadership for compliance, with spe-
cific guidelines for boards. at the outset, the Compliance Guidance for 
Hospitals noted, “the oiG believes that every effective compliance 
program must begin with a formal commitment by the hospital’s gov-
erning body to include all of the applicable elements . . . .”144 among 
140 Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Pros-
ecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. The McNulty Memorandum superseded a 
memorandum by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson that had set forth similar 
guidelines about consideration of board leadership and the adequacy of a compliance 
program in determining penalties. Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 
20, 2003), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm. 
141 While recognizing that the existence of a corporate compliance program is not 
sufficient by itself to justify a decision not to charge the corporation with criminal 
conduct, the memorandum stated that an active, well-designed program—or its 
absence—could play a role in prosecutorial decisions. Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, at 4 
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
142 Id. at 14.
143 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 35 at 8,987 
(Feb. 23, 1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp.pdf.
144 Id. at 8,989. The seven elements cited were: (1) written standards of conduct as well 
as policies and procedures to promote compliance; (2) a Chief Compliance Officer 
charged to operate the compliance program who reports to the CEO and Board of 
Directors; (3) training programs for all employees; (4) a process to receive complaints; 
(5) a system to respond to allegations of wrongdoing and disciplinary action against 
employees who violate compliance policies or federal or state law; (6) audits or other 
methods to monitor compliance; and (7) investigation and remediation of identified 
systemic problems and policies addressing sanctioned individuals. These same basic 
elements were set forth in the Compliance Guidance for Nursing Homes. Publication of 
the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities, at 14,289.
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the elements cited is the designation of a chief compliance officer 
who reports directly to the ceo and the governing body. the docu-
ment also highlights the importance of accountability, asserting that 
the evaluation of managers and supervisors should include their per-
formance in promoting and adhering to compliance. two years later, 
the oiG issued the Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 
reiterating the importance of the board’s role and the need for direct 
reporting about compliance to the board.145 updated revised compli-
ance guidance statements were issued for hospitals and nursing homes 
in 2005 and 2008, respectively. notably, both statements emphasize 
that, among other benefits, implementation of a voluntary compliance 
program “may significantly reduce the risk of unlawful conduct and 
corresponding sanctions.”146
adopted in 2002 in the aftermath of corporate scandals such as 
enron, worldcom, and arthur anderson, the sarbanes-oxley act 
sought to create more stringent standards for board accountability for 
financial management. while sarbanes-oxley applies only to public 
companies, it carried over into the nonprofit arena, establishing expec-
tations for best practices, although not for legally mandated change.147 
among other actions, sarbanes-oxley required boards to appoint 
an independent audit committee, include financial expertise on the 
board, train board members in financial literacy, and oversee the cre-
dentials and work of the auditing firm retained by the corporation. 
over recent years, the irs has steadily increased both its focus and 
standards for board governance of tax-exempt organizations.148 cen-
tral to tax-exempt status is the notion that the organization must serve 
public and not private purposes. in 2002, the irs issued final rules 
prohibiting “excess benefit transactions” for those in a position to influ-
ence corporate decisions, including explicit guidance for a process to 
145 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities at 14,289. 
146 OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals,  
70 Fed. Reg. 19 at 4,858 (Jan. 31, 2005), available at  
www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/012705HospSupplementalGuidance.pdf; 
oig suPPleMentAl CoMPliAnCe ProgrAM guidAnCe for nursing fACilities, at 56,832.
147 The American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, 116 Stat. 742 (2002). For a detailed discussion of the implications for and impact 
of Sarbanes-Oxley on nonprofit boards, See Robert T. Harper & Stephanie Schreiber, 
Hospital Board of Directors—the Challenges of Being a Hospital Director–Fiduciary Duties, 
Governance Issues and Board Composition, 13tH Ann. HeAltH lAW inst. (March 2007);  
G. Troyer et al., Governance Issues for Nonprofit Healthcare Organizations and the 
Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 ind. HeAltH l. rev 175 (2004). 
148 IRS rules for tax exemption have broad and complex application to nonprofit entities, 
with issues such as the requirement to provide community benefit that have particu-
lar salience for healthcare facilities. It has been argued that in recent years, the IRS 
“has become the primary regulator of nonprofit behavior.” James Fishman, Improv-
ing Charitable Accountability, 62 Md. l. rev. 218, 265 (2003). See also Thomas Greaney, 
New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 14 AnnAls HeAltH l. 
421, 426 (2005) (“The IRS has long served as a de facto monitor of corporate gover-
nance in the nonprofit sector.”).
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set executive compensation that would create a rebuttable presump-
tion of reasonableness.149 in february 2008, noting the strong link 
between good governance and tax law compliance, the irs released a 
detailed memorandum recommending good governance practices for 
tax exempt organizations.150 the recommended practices cover signifi-
cant ground, calling for, among other steps, an explicit statement of 
mission, a clear framework for governance, independent board mem-
bers, and written policies on conflicts of interest and protection for 
whistleblowers. the emphasis on transparency and executive compen-
sation was amplified by the release later in 2008 of the revised 990 tax 
form for nonprofits, which significantly expanded disclosure of gover-
nance practices and executive compensation.151 
Drafting a roadmap for boards: the oIG-AHLA Joint Statement and 
the NQF guide
the most explicit federal guidance about board fiduciary duties 
on quality issued to date is set forth in a 2004 joint statement issued 
by oiG and the american health lawyers association (the joint 
statement).152 identified as an educational resource for boards, the 
149 IRS Code § 4958.
150 Internal Revenue Service, Governance and Related Topics—501(c)(3) Organizations 
(Feb. 4, 2008) available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_practices.pdf. 
In addition, the memorandum recommended written policies for fundraising, careful 
review of financial audits, and written policies on document retention and destruction 
to prevent improper behavior in the face of a government investigation. 
151 IRS Code § 4958. Executive compensation has been a sustained area of focus 
for the IRS. In 2007, it released the results of a study of executive compensation 
by nonprofit entities, indicating significant problems with reporting of the 
compensation on 990 tax forms. Report on Exempt Organizations Executive 
Compensation Compliance Projects Parts I and II (March 2007), available at  
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec._comp._final.pdf. In August 2008, the IRS 
finalized the new Form 990, which requires, for the first time, reporting on specific 
board governance practices such as board composition and transparency, in  
addition to seeking more information about executive compensation. The  
2008 Form 990 is available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf. 
152 OIG & AHLA, CorPorAte resPonsiBility And HeAltH CAre QuAlity: A resourCe for HeAltH 
CAre BoArds of direCtors (2007), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/
complianceguidance/CorporateResponsibilityFinal%209-4-07.pdf. This is the third 
in a series of joint statements by the two organizations. The earlier two provided 
guidance to boards on overseeing corporate compliance, and to general counsel on 
promoting compliance. The OIG & AHLA, CorPorAte resPonsiBility And CorPorAte CoMPliAnCe: 
A resourCe for HeAltH CAre BoArds of direCtors (2003), available at  
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf;  
The OIG & AHLA, An integrAted APProACH to CorPorAte CoMPliAnCe: A resourCe for HeAltH 
CAre orgAnizAtion BoArds of direCtors, (2004), available at  
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/Tab%204E%20Appendx-Final.
pdf. See also Driving for Quality in Long-Term Care: A Board of Directors Dashboard, 
Government-Industry Roundtable, a joint statement by the OIG and the Health Care 
Compliance Association Roundtable on Long-Term Care Board of Directors’ Oversight 
of Quality of Care, laying out guidance for nursing home boards of directors. The 
advice echoed many of the recommendations in the Joint Statement for hospital 
boards, noting additional sources of information boards should consider, including 
resident complaints and family, resident, and staff satisfaction surveys.
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joint statement sets forth proactive best practices by boards. it does 
not specify grounds for enforcement in terms of poor or prohib-
ited conduct.153 nonetheless, the actions recommended in the joint 
statement may inform federal and state prosecutors as they weigh 
enforcement decisions. the joint statement recognizes the heightened 
focus on quality and concomitant heightened expectations for boards, 
“[w]ith a new era of focus on quality and patient safety rapidly emerg-
ing, oversight of quality also is becoming more clearly recognized as a 
core fiduciary responsibility of health care organization directors.”154 
at the outset, the joint statement summarizes board fiduciary duties 
for quality, asserting that boards are responsible for overseeing patient 
safety and healthcare quality. the joint statement urges that as atten-
tion is increasing on quality of care, boards adjust their practices to 
be responsive to a changing national environment.155 in addition, the 
joint statement stresses that quality has emerged as an enforcement 
priority for federal and state regulators. accordingly, it advises boards 
to seek regular reports about compliance risks posed by poor quality, 
and about the organization’s system to minimize and monitor these 
risks. the joint statement points to new financial arrangements at the 
intersection of quality and compliance that require oversight, includ-
ing pay-for-performance, gainsharing, and outcomes management.156 
the core of the joint statement is a series of questions designed to 
shape the board’s duties in overseeing healthcare quality. the ques-
tions guide a board’s inquiry into the design and implementation 
of the organization’s program on patient safety and quality, and the 
means to fulfill the board’s oversight obligation. the questions cover 
the following issues: 
1. the goals for quality and the measures to assess those goals;
2. the means to improve patient care and quality, and accountabil-
ity among key management and clinical staff for process and 
outcomes;
153 The Joint Statement lacks the weight of regulation, an opinion letter, or a formal 
guidance statement. Referring to the questions delineated to inform board inquiry 
in overseeing quality, the Joint Statement asserts that the questions raised in the 
document “are not intended to set forth any specific standards of care ….” OIG & 
AHLA, CorPorAte resPonsiBility And HeAltH CAre QuAlity: A resourCe for HeAltH CAre BoArds of 
direCtors at 1 (2007), available at www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/
CorporateResponsibilityFinal%209-4-07.pdf.
154 Id. at 1. The Joint Statement notes that the heightened focus on quality “increasingly 
impacts the responsibilities of corporate directors.” The Joint Statement implicitly rec-
ognizes that board oversight of healthcare quality has not been central to the board 
duties of care and obedience.
155 Id. at 4. 
156 Id. at 3. 
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3. operational policies and practices to support and monitor qual-
ity of care;
4. the board’s own competence to oversee quality, focusing on 
board training and expertise;
5. the information essential to the board to oversee quality, and a 
timetable for reports to the board;
6. coordination between the corporate compliance program and 
patient safety, and integration of quality concerns into correc-
tive action plans;
7. mechanisms to foster internal reports of quality problems;
8. the allocation of resources for quality improvement and patient 
safety;
9. the alignment of medical staff credentialing standards and peer 
review with the organization’s quality goals and measures; and
10. the response to adverse events both by the organization and 
by the board, so that the events are identified, analyzed, and 
addressed effectively.
in relation to this last goal, the joint statement notes the growing 
body of data that can point to patient safety concerns, including hospi-
tal quality data reported to cMs, adverse events reported to many state 
governments, and peer review reporting conducted in accord with the 
health care Quality improvement act.157 
in 2004, the national Quality forum (nQf) also released a guide 
for hospital boards of directors on fiduciary duties to oversee quality 
and patient safety.158 Hospital Governing Boards and Quality of Care: A Call 
to Responsibility begins with the statement that “board members often 
express confusion and uncertainty about what exactly they need to 
do to fulfill their responsibilities” to oversee healthcare quality.159 the 
nQf guide urges board engagement in many of the oversight actions 
proposed by the joint statement, with some additional guidance. the 
guide emphasizes that hospital governing boards must develop “qual-
ity literacy,” including familiarity with the structures in place to support 
patient safety, quality improvement, and measurement. it also under-
157 Id. at 11. While recognizing that these sources of data are a resource to the board, 
the Joint Statement cautions boards to seek legal counsel about the confidentiality 
protection accorded some of the information, and to proceed in a way that does not 
unnecessarily increase the organization’s exposure to liability. 
158 nAt’l QuAlity foruM, HosPitAl governing BoArds And QuAlity of CAre: A CAll to resPonsiBility 
(Dec. 2004), available at www.qualityforum.org/pdf/reports/call_to_responsibility.pdf. 
The recommendations in the document were prepared with input from experts in  
board fiduciary duties, healthcare measurement and quality, hospital leadership, 
and consumer organizations.
159 Id. at 1. 
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scores the board’s role in following up on poor performance on quality 
or safety measures, and the value of incentives for hospital executives 
to advance high performance.
The role of Health Systems on Healthcare Quality
in general, a board of director’s statutory obligation to oversee 
quality and common law fiduciary duties of care and mission are non-
delegable. thus, parent boards of a health system of hospitals, nursing 
homes, and other entities that deliver healthcare services cannot sup-
plant the boards of the facilities in overseeing quality. in some states, 
parent boards can share this responsibility with the entity board, sub-
ject to the express approval of state public health authorities.160 while 
health system boards in general do not assume direct responsibility 
for overseeing quality of care, it is conceivable that they could be 
held accountable for poor quality if they exercise corporate authority 
to interfere with the subsidiary entities’ efforts to improve quality or 
address quality-related compliance risks.161
some health systems have adopted mirror boards for parent and 
(one or all) subsidiary entities, establishing that the parent and sub-
sidiaries have the same members on the boards of directors. in this 
governance model, the parent and subsidiary entities do not share 
responsibility for healthcare quality. the board of the facility, observing 
corporate formalities of separate meetings, minutes and resolutions, 
oversees quality at the facility.162 while this model of corporate gover-
nance reduces conflict between entities within the system, streamlines 
the number of meetings, and centralizes control, it presents serious 
challenges to a board in fulfilling its duties to oversee matters as com-
plex and demanding as finance, quality, and compliance for numerous 
entities throughout the health system.163
160 For example, in New York state, hospitals can delegate or share operating authority 
with a parent entity if that entity has applied for and received state approval to serve 
in effect as a co-operator of the facility under Article 28 of the Public Health Law. In 
this process, proposed certificates of incorporation and bylaws for the parent entity 
and subsidiary facility must delineate the respective responsibilities for the entities on 
healthcare quality and other areas of operation.
161 For example, if the parent entity demanded budget cuts that reduced staffing to a 
level that created risks to patient safety, or insisted on policies that led to poor care, 
state public health authorities might seek to hold the entity accountable.
162 In some states, such as New York, the health system board can share responsibility 
for healthcare quality, subject to the governance documents and state approval. 
See Edward Kornreich, Corporate Governance Issues Faced by Orchard Health,  
9 HeAltH lAW j. 20, 22 (2004).
163 However, as found in a recent study, boards of health systems are more likely than hos-
pital boards to have a separate committee on quality, which could undertake oversight 
of numerous entities. J. Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality: Findings of a Survey of 
Hospital and System Leaders, 53 J. HeAltHCAre MgMt. 121 (2008) [hereinafter Jiang et al., 
Board Engagement in Quality].
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expertise and leadership on quality will vary from institution to 
institution in any health system. although health system boards do not 
have direct responsibility for quality of care, they can play an important 
role in improving quality by providing expertise, setting benchmarks 
for performance, and holding the subsidiary boards accountable for 
high performance on quality.164 the health system can offer training 
and protocols to enhance quality, and establish system-wide quality 
improvement initiatives and goals. like the subsidiary boards, the 
health system board can contribute to a culture that values and recog-
nizes high performance on quality.
board engagement on Quality:  What the Data Show
several recent studies provide insight into the level of board involve-
ment, specific activities boards undertake, and the attributes of board 
activity associated with higher-performing hospitals.165 overall, the 
data show a high level of board involvement in terms of review of qual-
ity measures and setting goals on quality, with more equivocal findings 
on board effectiveness as evaluated by chief executive officers.
Board time devoted to quality varies widely, ranging from less than 
five percent to more than twenty-five percent.166 Most hospital and health 
system boards use quality dashboards to review quality performance, and 
most dashboards include the cMs Quality compare Measures. there is 
wide variation, however, in how boards and institution-based leaders use 
the dashboards.167 health system boards are more likely than hospital 
boards to use quality dashboards, to incorporate national benchmarks 
in those dashboards, and to have a committee of the board devoted to 
quality.168 
hospitals or health systems where boards use dashboards with fewer 
measures and review them more frequently perform better in terms of 
quality of care.169 Board use of the dashboards for two years or longer 
164 Many health systems may be doing so, given the preponderance of quality com-
mittees at the board health system level. Id. The health system’s role in quality for 
subsidiary organizations should be delineated in its mission statement and corporate 
documents. 
165 Id.; T. Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives: 
Executive Quality Improvement Survey Results, 2 PAtient sAtisfACtion 2 (2006) [hereinafter 
Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives]; E. Kroch et 
al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards, 2 PAtient sAfety 10 (2006) [hereinafter Kroch 
et al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards].
166 Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives, at 3.
167 The study of 139 hospitals by Kroch et al. found that 87% of hospitals used a dash-
board on quality; the study of 562 hospitals and health systems by Jiang et al. found a 
virtually identical percent, 86.7. 
168 Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality, at 129. 86% of health system boards have a 
committee of the board devoted to quality vs. 58% of hospital boards.
169 Kroch et al, Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards, at 18.
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is also associated with higher hospital performance on quality. in addi-
tion, the involvement of a board quality committee in developing the 
content of the quality dashboard is associated with a significant dif-
ference in quality outcomes.170 one study examined the association 
between the existence of a board committee devoted to quality of care 
and other markers of board engagement on quality, concluding that 
boards with a quality committee performed significantly better on all 
measures of engagement; the boards were more likely to:
use quality dashboards (91% versus 79%);•	
set strategic goals for quality (89.5% versus 68.2%);•	
set the agenda for the board discussion on quality (48.8% versus •	
32.6%); 
include measures of quality and patient safety in executive per-•	
formance evaluation (61% versus 45%); and 
issue a written policy on quality communicated throughout the •	
organization (34% versus 26%).171
larger hospitals and those in the northeast were more likely than 
smaller hospitals to have board quality committees.172 
another study that examined different potential correlates between 
quality outcomes and quality leadership found that the following four 
factors were associated with better outcomes:
1. facilities with boards that spend more than twenty-five percent 
of board meeting time on quality;
2. a high level of interaction between board members and medical 
staff leaders in setting the hospital’s quality agenda;
3. identification of the ceo or coo by hospital leaders as the 
person with the “greatest impact” on quality; and
4. compensation of senior executives based in part on quality 
improvement performance.173
interestingly, the same study found a sharp difference in perception 
between ceos and chief medical officers (cMo)/quality improvement 
(Qi) executives about the most significant change that could improve 
quality. ceos were more likely to cite physician engagement as the 
change factor. cMos and Qi executives ranked health information 
170 As stated by the study authors, “Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that 
hospitals in which the board quality committees are strongly involved with the devel-
opment of the dashboard content had significantly higher performance ….” Id. at 16.
171 Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality, at 129. 
172 Id. at 129.
173 Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives, at 6.
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technology as more significant.174 in the one study that asked ceos 
about board performance on quality, less than half the ceos rated the 
board’s performance highly.175
Where Do boards Go From Here?
Devised as a platform for improvement and pay-for-performance, 
scientific advances in quality measurement and reporting have changed 
both the tools and expectations for board oversight of healthcare 
quality. a passive role for the board in reviewing credentialing decisions 
has been replaced by an emerging paradigm of a board that is better 
informed, better able to lead, and more accountable for quality of care. 
significantly, recent studies of board engagement on quality all suggest 
that many hospital boards are actively undertaking quality oversight.176 
as set forth in the roadmap laid out by the joint oiG-ahla state-
ment on board fiduciary duties, boards should undertake an array 
of tasks ranging from regular review of quality measures, training to 
understand the metrics for quality, creation of goals, and evaluation of 
resources and staff assigned to quality of care. in the traditional gover-
nance model, board members often were recruited primarily for their 
financial expertise and capacity to donate or raise funds. in the face of 
far more data and rising expectations for board oversight of quality, it 
is critical that boards evaluate their membership to determine if they 
have the expertise and passion for quality to drive board engagement 
and leadership. as suggested by the study by Kroch et al., boards that 
have a quality committee perform better on all measures of engage-
ment and leadership.177 
Boards should understand the measures used across all three dimen-
sions of quality and require a strategic plan for how the institution 
will improve performance in each area, including accountability for 
improvement among administrative and medical leadership. Boards 
also should set priorities for patient safety and quality, in consultation 
with executive and medical staff leadership. Public quality measures 
provide key information for boards and must be part of an overall strat-
egy for quality measurement and improvement. Boards should rely 
upon serious adverse or never events and near misses, as well as assess-
ment of quality concerns by the medical and nursing leadership, to 
identify other areas for improvement. Priorities also should establish 
174 Id. at 5.
175 The CEOs were asked to rate board performance on a scale of 1 to 6, with less than half 
the boards receiving a score of 5 or 6. Jiang et al., Board Engagement in Quality, at 125.
176 See Kroch et al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards; Jiang et al., Board Engagement 
in Quality; Vaughn et al., Engagement of Leadership in Quality Improvement Initiatives.
177 Kroch et al., Hospital Boards and Quality Dashboards.
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priorities or maintain practice areas of excellence key to the institu-
tion’s reputation and brand. 
Boards will need to evaluate where their institution stands on qual-
ity in a comparative sense, i.e., compared to the peer group for their 
institution in terms of academic or community hospital, size, and/or 
region. Boards should ask management for dashboards on quality that 
present the information in an actionable, concise form, and should be 
engaged in determining which measures are provided in the quality 
dashboard. for serious adverse events, boards should take an active 
role in seeking a corrective action plan and monitoring by appropriate 
staff to prevent further similar incidents.
finally, boards should seek data to evaluate risks and seek needed 
improvement at the intersection of quality and compliance. with cMs 
undertaking datamining to pursue and target investigations for poor 
quality, boards should seek information that can be generated from 
financial and care delivery databases to flag quality of care deficien-
cies that would trigger enforcement. to undertake the task, the board 
should seek a coordinated approach from leadership in quality and 
compliance.
recommendations for Government oversight
comparative quality measures and public reporting give govern-
ment new information and tools to oversee quality. while most states 
have relied on periodic joint commission surveys and self-reporting 
of serious adverse events to drive investigation of serious quality con-
cerns, states can now use quality measures to identify facilities that 
might have serious deficiencies in care. Measures of quality for medical 
treatment and certain measures of patient satisfaction (such as those 
that focus on adequate treatment for pain and acknowledgement of 
a patient’s treatment choices) should be reviewed by government to 
determine if patient care is so deficient that it places patients at risk. 
state governments and the joint commission should reevaluate the 
timing and nature of surveys in light of available quality data, giving 
consideration to more targeted assessments that focus on either poorly 
performing institutions or areas of care delivery where the data indi-
cate poor care.178
at the state level, attorneys general have the most direct oversight 
responsibility to oversee board performance in fulfilling their fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and mission. unquestionably, quality is core to 
178 See Donald M. Berwick & Troyen A. Brennan, New Rules: Regulation, Markets, and the 
Quality of American Health Care 369 (1995).
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mission for healthcare institutions, and a state attorney general could 
choose to reprimand or even replace a board of directors in an insti-
tution with severe, persistent quality problems that place patients at 
risk. at the same time, attorneys general are not familiar with qual-
ity of care metrics or delivery, which fall under the oversight of state 
health departments and cMs as payors and regulators of quality. for 
this reason, oversight of board performance on quality should rest with 
the agencies most able to carry out the responsibility.
the government’s approach to evaluation of board leadership 
should follow a pattern similar to compliance; demonstration that the 
board has focused on quality to provide leadership should be exculpa-
tory or reduce the size of any penalty, while board failure to address 
serious, persistent problems should be taken into account. the con-
nection between leadership, quality, and culture is well recognized, 
and boards should be held accountable for serious quality problems if 
data available to the board suggest that the problem has persisted over 
time without attempts to improve. 
Conclusion
legal doctrines enunciating board fiduciary duties, as well as state 
statutes vesting ultimate oversight of the quality of care in the board 
of directors, had little impact on the board’s role in improving patient 
safety and quality throughout the twentieth century. as reflected in 
the landmark report, To Err is Human, as well as in studies that pre-
ceded and followed it, serious medical errors leading to patient death 
or injury routinely occurred in healthcare facilities. the legal doctrine 
recognizing hospital responsibility for quality of care first handed 
down in Darling v. Charleston in 1965, and the rising tide of malpractice 
litigation that followed, did remarkably little to change the structure 
and nature of leadership on quality within healthcare institutions. 
Boards provided final approval for credentialing decisions, but mostly 
deferred to the organized medical staff as the locus of control and 
oversight of quality.179
until recently, systemic barriers impeded quality improvement, 
including the independence of the medical staff, the lack of reliable, 
comparative measures of quality, the lack of transparency in quality, 
and, most significantly, the absence of a business case for quality, with 
179 John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation: A Call for 
Change in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 HeAltH-MAtrix: j. l.-Med. 5 (2004); 
Thomas Greaney, New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 
14 AnnAls HeAltH l. 421, 422 (2005); Brian M. Peters & Jonathan Z. Cohen, Board Qual-
ity Oversight: A “Real World” Systemic Compliance Model, 14tH AnnuAl HeAltH lAW inst. 
(Mar. 2008).
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healthcare financial incentives misaligned to reward quality improve-
ment. in many respects, public and private payors, frustrated by the 
lack of national and institutional progress on quality, have driven the 
quality agenda. 
Medical staff control over quality rested in part on physicians’ exclu-
sive access to information about the quality of care. with the movement 
toward publicly reported measures, healthcare boards of directors are 
no longer dependent on the medical staff for information about per-
formance across all three dimensions of quality: patient safety, quality 
improvement, and patient satisfaction. the expanding use of informa-
tion systems, including the electronic medical record and bar coding 
that generate significant databases on quality under administrative 
control, add to institutional capacity to develop quality reports and 
increase board access to information. 
courts have not held healthcare boards to a duty to investigate to 
identify quality of care problems, recognizing that board members 
could rely on the ceo and other senior officers to bring problems to 
their attention, including poor quality of care. once notified of a con-
cern, however, boards are obligated to undertake an inquiry, inform 
themselves about the problem, and seek corrective action.180 it can 
be assumed that boards have notice of problems revealed in publicly 
reported quality measures or publicly reported patient safety errors. 
where quality scores fall well below performance measures for insti-
tutions comparable in size, patient mix, and region, boards should 
assume that the fiduciary duty to ask questions, seek an explanation, 
and demand solutions has been triggered.
while quality always has been core to healthcare facilities’ mission, 
financial incentives from public and private payors, transparency, and 
potentially large financial penalties tied to compliance sanctions for 
poor quality have changed the stakes for boards and their institutions. 
although facilities previously may have given quality of care initiatives 
lower priority in the face of financial challenges and difficult choices 
about investment of limited capital, pay-for-performance will make 
quality integral to financial goals and revenue. 
in the past, serious adverse events, when splashed across the head-
lines, had the potential to affect reputation on quality but were relatively 
rare and, absent specific warning signs, unanticipated by the board. in 
general, consumers continued to rely on word of mouth rather than 
180 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l 
Training School., 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D. D.C. 1974); In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Deriv. Litig., 
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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quality data to select hospitals.181 however, years of experiments and 
experience by business coalitions and national quality organizations 
seeking to make quality measures salient and actionable by the public 
may bear fruit. as suggested by one recent study, public measures 
combined with public reporting that provides a summary score or rec-
ommendation may influence both reputation and consumer choice of 
hospital.182 reputation may now be tied to quality measures in a tan-
gible way, with explicit data that can prompt board inquiry and action 
to protect and promote the institution’s reputation.
finally, heightened government enforcement of poor quality, com-
bined with financial incentives for compliance recoveries under the 
Deficit reduction act, create another powerful incentive for boards 
to focus on patient safety. federal and state enforcement has not only 
raised the financial costs of poor compliance, but increased expecta-
tions for board oversight, with direct implications for board duties on 
quality: enhanced board expertise and literacy, better reporting systems 
to identify problems, and increased accountability of senior manage-
ment for outcomes. at the same time, oiG compliance guidance and 
Department of justice sentencing Guidelines make clear that board 
performance in overseeing quality can have a direct impact on the 
price paid by institutions—in prosecutors’ decisions about violations 
and penalties.183
it has long been a truism that the board of directors has the ultimate 
responsibility for the quality of care. the absence of reportable qual-
ity measures, immature information systems, and the independence 
of medical staffs meant that the truism often was devoid of content. 
transparency in quality, comparative measures, and the rising stakes 
for healthcare quality have given boards powerful new incentives and 
new tools to lead on quality.
181 Judith H. Hibbard & Jacquelyn J. Jewett, Will Quality Report Cards Help Consumers?, 
16 HeAltH Aff. 218 (1997); Charles N. Kahn et al., Snapshot of Hospital Quality Reporting 
and Pay-For-Performance Under Medicare,” 25 HeAltH Aff. 148 (2006).
182 Judith H. Hibbard et al., It Isn’t Just about Choice: The Potential of a Public Performance 
Report to Affect the Public Image of Hospitals, 62 Med. CAre res. & rev. 358 (2005). The 
study by Hibbard et al., suggests that consumers will use quality information for choice 
if the information: (1) clearly identifies high and poor performers; (2) is concise; and 
(3) is widely disseminated.
183 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program for Nursing Facilities, at 14,289  
(listing grounds of poor quality that could lead to enforcement actions);  
Paul McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice. Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006), available at  
www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
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